Research Database

This paper, originally published in 1988, argues that there is nothing special about government-issued money, that without restrictions of some kind, privately issued money would be a perfect substitute for it. The paper describes the type of intermediation this argument implies for a laissez-faire economy. One important implication is that there would be only one risk-adjusted rate of return; either all assets would pay a low return to match that on money, or money would pay interest. Another important implication is that open market operations would be irrelevant. The paper argues that the reason we don't frequently observe economies with such characteristics is that governments generally impose restrictions which prevent the private issue of money. However, the paper does examine some historical periods when restrictions seemingly were not imposed. And it concludes with some reservations about the oversimplifying suggestion.

This study shows that in a standard one-sector neoclassical growth model, in which money is introduced with a cash-in-advance constraint, zero nominal interest rates are optimal. Milton Friedman argued in 1969 that zero nominal rates are necessary for efficient resource allocation. This study shows that they are not only necessary but sufficient. The study also characterizes the monetary policies that will implement zero rates. The set of such policies is quite large. The only restriction these policies must satisfy is that asymptotically money shrinks at a rate no greater than the rate of discount.

We provide an investigation of duration dependence in prewar business expansions, contractions, and whole cycles for France, Germany, and Great Britain. Our results, obtained using both nonparametric and parametric procedures, generally indicate the presence of positive duration dependence in expansions and whole cycles but not in contractions. Our results corroborate those of our earlier studies of the United States.

We consider four models of consumption that differ with respect to efficient risk-sharing and altruism. They range from complete markets with altruism to family risk-sharing. We use a matched sample of parents and independent children available from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to discriminate between the four models. Our testing procedure is designed to deal with the set of observed independent children being endogenously selected. The combined hypothesis of complete markets and altruism can be decisively rejected, while we fail to reject altruism and hence family risk-sharing for a subset of families.