Research Database

This paper examines how cash transfers that are not conditional on employment affect infant health. Leveraging variation in the amount of pandemic-era stimulus and child tax credit payments that families received based on household composition, I find that an additional $100 in transfers reduces the prevalence of low birthweight by 2-3 percent. Effects are larger for payments received later in pregnancy, but are of a similar magnitude across the population. These additional resources increased prenatal care and improved maternal health in ways that are consistent with families both increasing investments in children's health and improving the prenatal environment.

This paper studies the welfare effects of encouraging rural-urban migration in the developing world. To do so, we build and analyze a dynamic general-equilibrium model of migration that features a rich set of migration motives. We estimate the model to replicate the results of a field experiment that subsidized seasonal migration in rural Bangladesh, leading to significant increases in migration and consumption. We show that the welfare gains from migration subsidies come from providing better insurance for vulnerable rural households rather than correcting spatial misallocation by relaxing credit constraints for those with high productivity in urban areas that are stuck in rural areas.

Domestic abuse encompasses a range of damaging behaviours beyond physical violence, including economic and emotional abuse. This paper provides the first evidence on the impact of cohabiting with an abusive partner on victim’s economic outcomes. In so doing, we highlight the systematic role played by economic suppression and coercive control in such relationships. Using administrative data and a matched control event study design, along with a within-individual comparison of outcomes across relationships, we document three new facts. First, women who begin relationships with (eventually) physically abusive men suffer large and significant earnings and employment falls immediately upon cohabiting with the abusive partner, which translates into a total household income loss. Second, this decline in economic outcomes is non-monotonic in women’s pre-cohabitation outside options. Third, abusive men impose economic costs on all their female partners, even those who do not report physical violence. To rationalize these findings, we develop a new dynamic model of abusive relationships where women do not perfectly observe their partner’s type, and abusive men have an incentive to use coercive control to sabotage women’s outside options and their ability to later exit the relationship. We show that this model is consistent with all three empirical facts. We harness the model’s predictions to revisit some classic results on domestic violence and show that the relationship between domestic violence and women’s outside options is crucially linked to breakup dynamics.

We show how to use panel data on household consumption to directly estimate households’ risk preferences. Specifically, we measure heterogeneity in risk aversion among households in Thai villages using a full risk-sharing model, which we then test allowing for this heterogeneity. There is substantial, statistically significant heterogeneity in estimated risk preferences. Full insurance cannot be rejected. As the risk sharing, as-if-complete-markets theory might predict, estimated risk preferences are unrelated to wealth or other characteristics. The heterogeneity matters for policy: Although the average household would benefit from eliminating village-level risk, less-risk-averse households who are paid to absorb that risk would be worse off by several percent of household consumption.

ln environments with private information and spatial separation, the ability of agents to establish mutually beneficial arrangements can be limited by their ability to communicate contemporary dealings and histories of past dealings. Indeed, with the extension of some recent work in contract theory and mechanism design, this paper argues that location or person-specific assignment systems, portable object record-keeping systems, written message systems, and telecommunication systems can be viewed as communication systems which are successively more complete in this sense. An attempt is made also to match these various communication systems with systems in use in historical primitive, and/or contemporary societies and to interpret these communication systems as financial structures.

I develop a heterogeneous-agent New-Keynesian model featuring racial inequality in income and wealth, and studies interactions between racial inequality and monetary policy. Black and Hispanic workers gain more from accommodative monetary policy than White workers mainly due to higher labor market risks. Their gains are larger also because of a larger proportion of them are hand-to-mouth, while wealthy White workers gain more from asset price appreciation. Monetary and fiscal policies are substitutes in providing insurance against cyclical labor market risks. Racial minorities gain even more from an accommodative monetary policy in the absence of income-dependent fiscal transfers.

We show that if the central bank operates without commitment and faces constraints on its balance sheet, helicopter drops can be a useful stabilization tool during a liquidity trap. In our model, even with balance sheet constraints, helicopter drops are at best irrelevant under commitment.

Parental investments significantly impact children’s outcomes. Exploiting panel data covering individuals from birth to retirement, we estimate child skill production functions and embed them into an estimated dynastic model in which altruistic mothers and fathers make investments in their children. We find that time investments, educational investments, and assortative matching have a greater impact on generating inequality and intergenerational persistence than cash transfers. While education subsidies can reduce inequality, due to an estimated dynamic complementarity between time investments and education, it is crucial to announce them in advance to allow parents to adjust their investments when their children are young.

Past research has provided evidence of clientelistic politics in delivery of program benefits by local governments (gram panchayats (GPs)), and manipulation of GP program budgets by legislators and elected officials at upper tiers in West Bengal, India. Using household panel survey data spanning 1998-2008, we examine the consequences of clientelism for distributive equity. We find that targeting of anti-poverty programs was progressive both within and across GPs, and is explained by greater 'vote responsiveness' of poor households to receipt of welfare benefits. Across-GP allocations were more progressive than a rule-based formula recommended by the 3rd State Finance Commission (SFC) based on GP demographic characteristics. Moreover, alternative formulae for across-GP budgets obtained by varying weights on GP characteristics used in the SFC formula would have improved pro-poor targeting only marginally. Hence, there is not much scope for improving pro-poor targeting of private benefits by transitioning to formula-based budgeting.