Research Database

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy, these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital, these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.

In what order should a developing country adopt policy reforms? Do some policies complement each other? Do others substitute for each other? To address these questions, we develop a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with entry and exit of firms that are monopolistic competitors. Distortions in the model include barriers to entry of firms, barriers to international trade, and barriers to contract enforcement. We find that a reform that reduces one of these distortions has different effects depending on the other distortions present. In particular, reforms to trade barriers and barriers to the entry of new firms are substitutable, as are reforms to contract enforcement and trade barriers. In contrast, reforms to contract enforcement and the barriers to entry are complementary. Finally, the optimal sequencing of reforms requires reforming trade barriers before contract enforcement.

Search theory routinely assumes that decisions about the acceptance/rejection of job offers (and, hence, about labor market movements between jobs or across employment states) are made by individuals acting in isolation. In reality, the vast majority of workers are somewhat tied to their partners—in couples and families—and decisions are made jointly. This paper studies, from a theoretical viewpoint, the joint job-search and location problem of a household formed by a couple (e.g., husband and wife) who perfectly pools income. The objective of the exercise, very much in the spirit of standard search theory, is to characterize the reservation wage behavior of the couple and compare it to the single-agent search model in order to understand the ramifications of partnerships for individual labor market outcomes and wage dynamics. We focus on two main cases. First, when couples are risk averse and pool income, joint search yields new opportunities—similar to on-the-job search—relative to the single-agent search. Second, when the two spouses in a couple face job offers from multiple locations and a cost of living apart, joint search features new frictions and can lead to significantly worse outcomes than single-agent search.

We solve equilibrium models of lumpy investment wherein establishments face persistent shocks to common and plant-specific productivity. Nonconvex adjustment costs lead plants to pursue generalized (S, s) rules with respect to capital; thus, their investments are lumpy. In partial equilibrium, this yields substantial skewness and kurtosis in aggregate investment, though, with differences in plant-level productivity, these nonlinearities are far less pronounced. Moreover, nonconvex costs, like quadratic adjustment costs, increase the persistence of aggregate investment, yielding a better match with the data. In general equilibrium, aggregate nonlinearities disappear, and investment rates are very persistent, regardless of adjustment costs. While the aggregate implications of lumpy investment change substantially in equilibrium, the inclusion of fixed costs or idiosyncratic shocks makes the average distribution of plant investment rates largely invariant to market-clearing movements in real wages and interest rates. Nonetheless, we find that understanding the dynamics of plant-level investment requires general equilibrium analysis.

This study attempts to determine whether entry regulation is more restrictive in unit or branch banking states.

A model is developed in which entry, defined as the formation of a new bank or branch, is explained as being a response to the general economic climate plus regulation. Using time series data and dating the onset of effective entry regulation with the passage of the banking Act of 1935, it is ascertained that effective entry regulation has caused the aggregate rate of entry into commercial banking to fall by about sixty percent. This analysis included adjustments for changes in economic conditions. The effect of entry regulation, however, has not been uniform. Entry rates in unit banking states is estimated to be seventy percent lower than it would have been in the absence of regulation, while limited branching and statewide branching states have experienced fifty and forty percent declines, respectively.

This analysis suggests that entry in unit banking states has been more restricted than in branch banking states. Two reasons are cited that may account for this differential impact of regulation. First, regulators may tend to be more pessimistic than potential entrants regarding the profitability of a new banking office. This pessimism may not have a significant effect upon entry when other factors indicate a high probability of success, but may be important in marginal cases. Thus, because branch banking states tend to be more prevalent in the west, and because this has been the area of greatest economic growth in the past forty years, the pessimism of regulators would tend to be less apparent in branch banking areas. Second, regulators apparently prefer to issue charters for new branches rather than for new banks because they have more information on which to base their decisions. In addition, if the market demand is misjudged, a branch bank has retained earnings and other branches from which to carry short-term losses.

The central finding of the recent structural vector autoregression (SVAR) literature with a differenced specification of hours is that technology shocks lead to a fall in hours. Researchers have used this finding to argue that real business cycle models are unpromising. We subject this SVAR specification to a natural economic test and show that when applied to data from a multiple-shock business cycle model, the procedure incorrectly concludes that the model could not have generated the data as long as demand shocks play a nontrivial role. We also test another popular specification, which uses the level of hours, and show that with nontrivial demand shocks, it cannot distinguish between real business cycle models and sticky price models. The crux of the problem for both SVAR specifications is that available data require a VAR with a small number of lags and such a VAR is a poor approximation to the model’s VAR.

No abstract available.

Portfolio autarky obtains when residents of every country are prohibited from owning real assets located in other countries. Such a regime and a laissez-faire regime, both characterized by free trade in goods, are studied in a model whose resource and technology assumptions are those of the standard two-country, two- (nonreproducible) factor, two- (nonstorable) good model. But to ensure a market for assets (land), the model is peopled by overlapping generations; each two-period lived individual supplies one unit of labor only in the first period of his life. Unique equilibria are described and shown to exist, and, in terms of a “growth model” version of the Pareto criterion, laissez-faire is shown to be optimal and portfolio autarky to be nonoptimal.

Scapegoating is often said to be a source of inefficiency in organizations. In this paper, I analyze the consequences of scapegoating within a firm in a model where reputation concerns drive the actions of superiors. Consider delegation choices, for example. Hiring efficient workers may be a good idea if successful production is the only way to build reputation. But if successful scapegoating also increases reputation, superiors will tend to hire less efficient workers and will eventually blame them for failures. I characterize scapegoating as an activity “nested” after failures. Even though the results of scapegoating do not affect welfare directly, they do so indirectly through the decisions governing the probability of success in production. We examine how activities “nested” after good results may increase efficiency without relying on costly incentives and why superiors tend to hire better workers during good times.

I argue that Farmer and Guo's one-sector real business cycle model with indeterminacy and sunspots fails empirically and that its failure is inherent in the logic of the model taken together with some simple labor market facts.