Creator: Roberds, William. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 264 Abstract:
A popular method of investigating the market effects of multibank holding company (MBHC) affiliation involves regression of banks' local market share on a dummy variable for MBHC affiliation. The usefulness of this procedure is called into question by means of a theoretical counterexample.
Keyword: Bank holding company, Bank merger, Nonprice competition, and Multibank holding companies Subject (JEL): D40 - Market structure and pricing - General and G21 - Financial institutions and services - Banks ; Other depository institutions ; Micro finance institutions ; Mortgages
Creator: Aiyagari, S. Rao. and Peled, Dan. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 503 Abstract:
It is often argued that with a positively skewed income distribution (median less than mean) a majority voting over proportional tax rates would result in higher tax rates than those that maximize average welfare, and will accordingly reduce aggregate savings. We reexamine this view in a capital accumulation model, in which distorting redistributive taxes provide insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, and income distributions evolve endogenously. We find small differences of either sign between the tax rates set by a majority voting and a utilitarian government, for reasonable parametric specifications. We show how these differences reflect a greater responsiveness of a utilitarian government to the average need for the insurance provided by the tax-redistribution scheme. These conclusions remain true despite the fact that the model simulations produce positively skewed distributions of total income across agents.
Keyword: Taxes, Income distribution, and Votes Subject (JEL): E62 - Macroeconomic policy, macroeconomic aspects of public finance, and general outlook - Fiscal policy and D72 - Analysis of collective decision-making - Models of political processes : Rent-seeking, elections, legislatures, and voting behavior
Creator: Altug, Sumru. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 366 Description:
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Keyword: Idiosyncratic risk, Assymetric information , Transaction cost, Private information, Borrowing constraint, Lending, and Market friction Subject (JEL): D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information and D52 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - Incomplete markets
Creator: Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 228 Abstract:
"Summary of Recommendations: . . . Repeal present control by the System over interest rates that member banks may pay on time deposits and present prohibition of interest payments by member banks on demand deposits." Milton Friedman (1960, p. 100) "I conclude that the over-all monetary effects of ceiling regulations are small and easy to neutralize by traditional monetary controls. The allocative and distributive effects are, however, unfortunate. The root of the policy was an exaggerated and largely unnecessary concern for the technical solvency of savings and loan associations." James Tobin (1970, p. 5) The regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists. The same is true for the original rationale for such regulation: that bank competition for deposits generates inherent "instability" in the banking system. This paper develops an "adverse selection" model of banking in which this rationale is correct. Moreover, in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a "lender of last resort," and despite the absence of any need for "deposit insurance." However, in the world described, the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to "instability" in the banking system. Finally, it is argued that "adverse selection" models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts.
Keyword: Banking Act, Banking Act of 1933, Banking panics, Banking Act of 1935, Risk, Bank regulation, Instability, and Unregulated banks Subject (JEL): D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information, E42 - Money and interest rates - Monetary systems ; Standards ; Regimes ; Government and the monetary system ; Payment systems, G11 - General financial markets - Portfolio choice ; Investment decisions, and G21 - Financial institutions and services - Banks ; Other depository institutions ; Micro finance institutions ; Mortgages
Creator: Backus, David. and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 348 Abstract:
We derive the empirical implications of a popular class of international macroeconomic models. The real economy is a stochastic exchange model with complete markets. A standard result is that cross-country risk sharing implies perfect correlation between consumption paths across countries. With mild restrictions on the endowment process ii also implies a positive correlation between net exports and output in every country. We introduce money using cash-in-advance constraints and show that the implications for real variables carry over into the monetary economy. These dichotomy and neutrality propositions generalize those in the literature to stochastic environments with heterogeneous agents, and do not require the cash-in-advance constraint to bind in every state. They imply that any correlation between the nominal exchange rate and the balance of trade can be made consistent with the theory.
Keyword: Government finance, Exchange rates, Risk-sharing, Monetary policy, and Cash-in-advance Subject (JEL): E32 - Prices, business fluctuations, and cycles - Business fluctuations ; Cycles, F30 - International finance - General, and D46 - Market structure and pricing - Value theory
Creator: Williamson, Stephen D. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 405 Abstract:
A model is constructed where banks provide access to a communication technology which facilitates trade. Bank liabilities may coexist with alternative means of payment in equilibrium, and there exist regions of the parameter space where banking dominates the payments system and where physical exchange media dominate. The model is consistent with some observations concerning the role of the banking system in economic development, and with characteristics of banking crises. In particular, in early stages of economic development: 1) rapid output growth is accompanied by an increasing share of banking in transactions activity and 2) there are recurrent banking "panics" where reductions in measured aggregate output coincide with increases in the use of alternative means of payment relative to bank liabilities. In later stages of development, growth slackens off, the share of banking in the payments system stabilizes and the economy is less likely to be subject to banking panics.
Prepared for a conference on "Models of Money and Intermediation," University of Western Ontario, October 1988. A preliminary version was presented at the NBER Summer Institute, July 1988.
Keyword: Communication cost, Financial panic, Banks, Communication technology, and Banking panics Subject (JEL): O33 - Technological change ; Research and development - Technological change : Choices and consequences ; Diffusion processes and G21 - Financial institutions and services - Banks ; Other depository institutions ; Micro finance institutions ; Mortgages
Creator: Boyd, John H. and Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 512 Abstract:
We investigate ex-ante efficient contracts in an environment in which implementation is costless. In this environment, standard debt contracts will typically not be optimal. Optimal contracts may involve defaults, even in states in which the borrower is fully able to repay. We then examine the welfare costs of arbitrarily restricting the set of feasible contracts to standard debt contracts. When model parameters are calibrated to realistic values, the welfare loss from exogenously imposing this restriction is extremely small. Thus, if the implementation costs are actually nontrivial (as seems likely), standard debt contracts will be (very close to) optimal.
Keyword: CESV, CSV, Debt, Contracts, Standard debt contract, Costly ex-post state verification, Bankruptcy, Optimal contract, Ex ante contract, Financial contract, Loans, and Costly state verification Subject (JEL): D86 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Economics of contract : Theory and G10 - General financial markets - General
Creator: Boyd, John H. and Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 522 Abstract:
We consider a two country growth model with international capital markets. These markets fund capital investment in both countries, and operate subject to a costly state verification (CSV) problem. Investors in each country require some external finance, but also provide internal finance, which mitigates the CSV problem. When two identical (except for their initial capital stocks) economies are closed, they necessarily converge monotonically to the same steady state output level. Unrestricted international financial trade precludes otherwise identical economies from converging, and poor countries are necessarily net lenders to rich countries. Oscillation in real activity and international capital flows can occur.
Keyword: CSV, International lending, Capital investment, Credit rationing, International capital markets, Credit, Costly state verification, Closed economy, and Open economy Subject (JEL): O16 - Economic development - Financial markets ; Saving and capital investment ; Corporate finance and governance and F34 - International finance - International lending and debt problems