Creator: Bartelsman, Eric J. and Beaulieu, J. Joseph. Series: Joint committee on business and financial analysis Abstract:
This paper is the first of a series of explorations in the relative performance and sources of productivity growth of U.S. businesses across industries and legal structure. In order to assemble the disparate data from various sources to develop a coherent productivity database, we developed a general system to manage data. The paper describes this system and then applies it by building such a database. The paper presents updated estimates of gross output, intermediate input use and value added using the BEA=s GPO data set. It supplements these data with estimates of missing data on intermediate input use and prices for the 1977-1986 period, and it concords these data, which are organized on a 1972 SIC basis, to the 1987 SIC in order to have consistent time series covering the last twenty-four years. It further refines these data by disaggregating them by legal form of organization. The paper also presents estimates of labor hours, investment, capital services and, consequently, multifactor productivity disaggregated by industry and legal form of organization, and it analyzes the contribution of various industries and business organizations to aggregate productivity. The paper also reconsiders these estimates in light of the surge in spending in advance of the century-date change.
Stichwort: Industrial productivity, Database design, Labor productivity, and Legal form of organization Fach: D24 - Production and organizations - Production ; Cost ; Capital and total factor productivity ; Capacity and E23 - Macroeconomics : Consumption, saving, production, employment, and investment - Production
Creator: Reinert, Kenneth A. and Shiells, Clinton R. Series: Modeling North American economic integration Abstract:
Elasticities of substitutions between U.S. imports from Mexico, Canada, the rest of the world, and competing domestic production are estimated for 128 mining and manufacturing sectors, based on quarterly data for 1980-88. Results will be useful for subsequent computable general equilibrium (CGE) model simulations of North American trade, including the proposed free trade area between Mexico and the United States.
Fach: D58 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - Computable and other applied general equilibrium models and F15 - Economic Integration
Creator: Townsend, Robert M., 1948- Series: Financial history conference Abstract:
ln environments with private information and spatial separation, the ability of agents to establish mutually beneficial arrangements can be limited by their ability to communicate contemporary dealings and histories of past dealings. Indeed, with the extension of some recent work in contract theory and mechanism design, this paper argues that location or person-specific assignment systems, portable object record-keeping systems, written message systems, and telecommunication systems can be viewed as communication systems which are successively more complete in this sense. An attempt is made also to match these various communication systems with systems in use in historical primitive, and/or contemporary societies and to interpret these communication systems as financial structures.
Fach: C44 - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory, D83 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Search ; Learning ; Information and knowledge ; Communication ; Belief, and D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Creator: Austen-Smith, David. Series: Conference on economics and politics Abstract:
This paper explores the extent and character of interest group influence on legislative policy in a model of decision making under incomplete information. A committee may propose an alternative to a given status quo under closed rule. Policies are related to consequences with ex ante uncertainty. An interest group is able to acquire policy—relevant information at a price, and has access to legislators at both the agenda setting stage and the vote stage. Lobbying is modeled as a game of strategic information transmission. The price of information is itself a private datum to the group, and legislators cannot observe whether the group elects to become informed. If the group is informed, then its information is likewise private. Among the results are: that not all informed lobbyists choose to try and influence the agenda directly; that there can coexist influential lobbying at both stages of the process; and that while informative agenda stage lobbying is genetically influential, the same is not true of voting stage lobbying.
Fach: D72 - Analysis of collective decision-making - Models of political processes : Rent-seeking, elections, legislatures, and voting behavior and D83 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Search ; Learning ; Information and knowledge ; Communication ; Belief
Creator: Boot, Arnoud W. A. (Willem Alexander), 1960-, Greenbaum, Stuart I., and Thakor, Anjan V. Series: Monetary theory and financial intermediation Abstract:
We explain why contracting parties may choose ambiguous financial contracts. Introducing ambiguity may be optimal, even when unambiguous contracts can be costlessly written. We show that an ambiguous contract has two advantages. First, it permits the guarantor to sacrifice reputational capital in order to preserve financial capital as well as information reusability in states where such tradeoff is optimal. Second, it fosters the development of reputation. This theory is then used to explain ambiguity in mutual fund contracts, bank loan commitments, bank holding company relationships, the investment banker's "highly confident" letter, non-recourse debt contracts in project financing, and other financial contracts.
Fach: G20 - Financial Institutions and Services: General, K12 - Contract Law, and D86 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Economics of contract : Theory
Creator: Persson, Torsten. and Tabellini, Guido Enrico, 1956- Series: Conference on economics and politics Abstract:
Inspired by the current European developments, we study equilibrium fiscal policy under alternative constitutional arrangements in a "federation" of countries. There are two levels of government: local and federal. Local policy redistributes across individuals and affects the probability of aggregate shocks, while federal policy shares international risk. Policies are chosen under majority rule. There is a moral hazard problem: federal risk-sharing can induce the local governments to enact policies that increase local risk. We investigate this incentive problem under alternative fiscal constitutions. In particular, we contrast a vertically ordered system like the EC with a horizontally ordered federal system like the US. These alternative arrangements are not neutral, in the sense that they create different incentives for policymakers and voters, and give rise to different political equilibria. A general conclusion is that, centralization of functions and power can be welfare improving under appropriate institutions. However, this conclusion only applies to the moral hazard problem and a federation where the countries are not too dissimilar.
Stichwort: Fiscal federalism, Politics, Risk sharing, and Principal—agent models Fach: D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General, E60 - Macroeconomic policy, macroeconomic aspects of public finance, and general outlook - General, and H10 - Structure and Scope of Government: General