Risultati della ricerca
Creator: Stutzer, Michael J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 197 Abstract:
Antitrust regulators often attempt to prevent proposed corporate market-extension mergers or acquisitions by arguing that doing so will result in the proposer entering the market as an additional, smaller, independent competitor. In cases where this so-called doctrine of probable future competition is valid, regulators still need guidance in ranking the priority of cases to pursue. This paper modifies the approach of Dansby and Willig to compute measures of the gross benefits arising from valid regulation. Such measures relate the change in consumer plus producer surplus caused by regulation, to measures of market concentration, firm conduct assumptions, small firm profits, and market demand data.
Parola chiave: Acquisition, Antitrust regulation, Market extension, and Merger Soggetto: L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets, K21 - Antitrust Law, and L40 - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Creator: Marshall, Robert and Merlo, Antonio Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 220 Abstract:
Many unions in the United States have for several years engaged in what is known as pattern bargaining—a union determines a sequence for negotiations with firms within an industry where the agreement with the first firm becomes the take-it-or-leave-it offer by the union for all subsequent negotiations. In this paper, we show that pattern bargaining is preferred by a union to both simultaneous industrywide negotiations and sequential negotiations without a pattern. In recent years, unions have increasingly moved away from patterns that equalized wage rates across firms when these patterns did not equalize interfirm labor costs. Allowing for interfirm productivity differentials within an industry, we show that for small interfirm productivity differentials, the union most prefers a pattern in wages, but for a sufficiently wide differential, the union prefers a pattern in labor costs.
Soggetto: L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets and J50 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
Creator: Mongey, Simon J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 558 Abstract:
I propose an equilibrium menu cost model with a continuum of sectors, each consisting of strategically engaged firms. Compared to a model with monopolistically competitive sectors that is calibrated to the same data on good-level price flexibility, the dynamic duopoly model features a smaller inflation response to monetary shocks and output responses that are more than twice as large. The model also implies (i) four times larger welfare losses from nominal rigidities, (ii) smaller menu costs and idiosyncratic shocks are needed to match the data, (iii) a U-shaped relationship between market concentration and price flexibility, for which I find empirical support.
Parola chiave: Firm dynamics, Menu costs, Oligopoly, and Monetary policy Soggetto: L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets, E30 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data), E51 - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers, L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms, and E39 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: Other