Creator: Miller, Preston J. and Todd, Richard M. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 494 Abstract:
This paper investigates the macroeconomic and welfare effects of a particular public finance decision. That decision was to use debt rather than current taxation to finance deposit insurance payments related to the savings and loan debacle. We find that this decision could have significantly raised real interest rates and affected welfare. The analysis is conducted in a dynamic, open-economy, monetary general equilibrium model in which parameters are set based on empirical observations.
Keyword: Real interest rates, Deposit insurance, Public finance, Savings and loan, Taxation, Welfare, Government debt, and S & L Subject (JEL): H63 - National budget, deficit, and debt - Debt ; Debt management and G21 - Financial institutions and services - Banks ; Other depository institutions ; Micro finance institutions ; Mortgages
Creator: Miller, Preston J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 220 Description:
WP 220 was presented at The Economic Consequences of Government Deficits : an Economic Policy Conference, cosponsored by the Center for the Study of American Business and the Institute of Banking and Financial Markets at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, October 29-30, 1982.
Keyword: Tax policy, Federal debt, Deficit, Inflation, and Budget policy Subject (JEL): H63 - National budget, deficit, and debt - Debt ; Debt management, E42 - Money and interest rates - Monetary systems ; Standards ; Regimes ; Government and the monetary system ; Payment systems, E52 - Monetary policy, central banking, and the supply of money and credit - Monetary policy, and H62 - National budget, deficit, and debt - Deficit ; Surplus
Creator: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957-, Dow, James, 1961 -, and English, William B. (William Berkeley), 1960- Series: International perspectives on debt, growth, and business cycles Abstract:
We consider a model of international sovereign debt where repayment is enforced because defaulting nations lose their reputation and consequently, are excluded from international capital markets. Underlying the analysis of reputation is the hypothesis that borrowing countries have different, unobservable, attitudes towards the future. Some regimes are relatively myopic, while others are willing to make sacrifices to preserve their access to debt markets. Nations' preferences, while unobservable, are not fixed but evolve over time according to a Markov process. We make two main points. First we argue that in models of sovereign debt the length of the punishment interval that follows a default should be based on economic factors rather than being chosen arbitrarily. In our model, the length of the most natural punishment interval depends primarily on the preference parameters. Second, we point out that there is a more direct way for governments to regain their reputation. By offering to partially repay loans in default, a government can signal its reliability. This type of signaling can cause punishment interval equilibria to break down. We examine the historical record on lending resumption to argue that in almost all cases, some kind of partial repayment was made.
Subject (JEL): H63 - National budget, deficit, and debt - Debt ; Debt management and F34 - International finance - International lending and debt problems