Risultati della ricerca
Creator: Green, Edward J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 501 Abstract:
I consider two theories of the determination of political institutions. One of these theories stresses effects of changes in the balance of military power between the ruler and subjects on the distribution of property rights which the political system enforces. The other theory emphasizes the effect of changing informational constraints which require institutional changes to be made in order to maintain efficiency. I examine how each of these theories would apply to explaining the development of parliamentary government in thirteenth-century England. My general conclusion is that both theories are required to understand fully the process by which liberal political institutions emerge.
Parola chiave: History, Government, England, and Great Britain Soggetto: N43 - Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: Europe: Pre-1913 and H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Creator: Boldrin, Michele and Montes, Ana Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 336 Abstract:
When credit markets to finance investment in human capital are missing, the competitive equilibrium allocation is inefficient. When generations overlap, this failure can be mitigated by properly designed social arrangements. We show that public financing of education and public pensions can be designed to implement an intergenerational transfer scheme supporting the complete market allocation. Neither the public financing of education nor the pension scheme we consider resemble standard ones. In our mechanism, via the public education system, the young borrow from the middle aged to invest in human capital. They pay back the debt via a social security tax, the proceedings of which finance pension payments. When the complete market allocation is achieved, the rate of return implicit in this borrowing-lending scheme should equal the market rate of return.
Parola chiave: Efficient intergenerational arrangements, Public education, and Public pensions Soggetto: O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development, I20 - Education and Research Institutions: General, H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government, H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods, and H30 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
Creator: Krusell, Per and Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 234 Abstract:
We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard’s median-voter analysis of the size of government. Taxes are proportional to total income, and they are used for government consumption, which is exogenous, and for lump-sum transfers, whose size is chosen by electoral vote. Votes take place sequentially over time, and each agent votes for the policy that maximizes his equilibrium utility. We calibrate the model and its income and wealth distribution to match postwar U.S. data. This allows a quantitative assessment of the equilibrium costs of redistribution, which involves distortions to the labor-leisure and consumption-savings choices, and of its benefits for the decisive voter. We find that the total size of transfers predicted by our political-economy model is quite close to the size of transfers in the data.
Soggetto: H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government, P16 - Capitalist Systems: Political Economy, and O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models