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Creator: Chari, V. V. and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 317 Abstract:
This paper examines the limiting behavior of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policies as countries market power goes to zero. In the first part we provide sufficient conditions for these policies to converge. In the second part we provide examples where these policies diverge. Briefly, we show that if there are unremovable domestic distortions then there can be gains to coordination between countries even when countries have no ability to affect world prices. These results are at variance with the received wisdom in the optimal tariff literature. The key distinction is that we model explicitly the spending decisions of the government while the optimal tariff literature does not.
Palabra clave: Fiscal policy and International economic relations Tema: N10 - Economic History: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations: General, International, or Comparative and F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
Creator: Kehoe, Patrick J. and Pastorino, Elena Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 543 Abstract:
Before the advent of sophisticated international financial markets, a widely accepted belief was that within a monetary union, a union-wide authority orchestrating fiscal transfers between countries is necessary to provide adequate insurance against country-specific economic fluctuations. A natural question is then: Do sophisticated international financial markets obviate the need for such an active union-wide authority? We argue that they do. Specifically, we show that in a benchmark economy with no international financial markets, an activist union-wide authority is necessary to achieve desirable outcomes. With sophisticated financial markets, however, such an authority is unnecessary if its only goal is to provide cross-country insurance. Since restricting the set of policy instruments available to member countries does not create a fiscal externality across them, this result holds in a wide variety of settings. Finally, we establish that an activist union-wide authority concerned just with providing insurance across member countries is optimal only when individual countries are either unable or unwilling to pursue desirable policies
Palabra clave: Fiscal externalities, Cross-country externalities, International transfers, Optimal currency area, Cross-country transfers, International financial markets, and Cross-country insurance Tema: G28 - Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation, F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions, F38 - International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls, F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission, E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination, G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation, E60 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General, G15 - International Financial Markets, and F35 - Foreign Aid
Creator: Heathcote, Jonathan and Perri, Fabrizio Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 523 Abstract:
In a standard two-country international macro model, we ask whether imposing restrictions on international non contingent borrowing and lending is ever desirable. The answer is yes. If one country imposes capital controls unilaterally, it can generate favorable changes in the dynamics of equilibrium interest rates and the terms of trade, and thereby benefit at the expense of its trading partner. If both countries simultaneously impose capital controls, the welfare effects are ambiguous. We identify calibrations in which symmetric capital controls improve terms of trade insurance against country-specific shocks and thereby increase welfare for both countries.
Palabra clave: Terms of trade, International risk sharing, and Capital controls Tema: F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission, F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics, and F32 - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
Creator: Chari, V. V. and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 330 Abstract:
The desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to follow its policies. If it can commit, then debt constraints can only impose costs. If it cannot commit, then fiscal policy has a free-rider problem, and debt constraints may be desirable. This type of free-rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem.
Tema: F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions, E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy, F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission, F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics, and E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
Creator: Chari, V. V. and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 308 Abstract:
We analyze the setting of monetary and nonmonetary policies in monetary unions. We show that in these unions a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free-rider problem in the setting of nonmonetary policies, such as labor market policy, fiscal policy, and bank regulation. The free-rider problem leads the union’s members to pursue lax nonmonetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation. The free-rider problem can be mitigated by imposing constraints on the nonmonetary policies, like unionwide rules on labor market policy, debt constraints on members’ fiscal policy, and unionwide regulation of banks. When there is no time inconsistency problem, there is no free-rider problem, and constraints on nonmonetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful.
Palabra clave: Fixed exchange rates, Monetary regime, Maastricht Treaty, European Union, and Dollarization Tema: F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions, E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems, E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy, F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission, E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination, F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics, F30 - International Finance: General, and E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies