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D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information
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Creator: Williamson, Stephen D. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 382 Abstract: A model with private information is constructed that supports conventional arguments for a government monopoly in supplying circulating media of exchange. The model also yields predictions, including rate-of-return dominance of circulating media of exchange, that are consistent with observations from free banking regimes and fiat money regimes. In a laissez faire banking equilibrium, fiat money is not valued, and the resulting allocation is not Pareto optimal. However, if private agents are restricted from issuing circulating notes, there exists an equilibrium with valued fiat money that Pareto dominates the laissez faire equilibrium and is constrained Pareto optimal. Mot-clé: Assymetric information, Private information, Money, Currency, Monetary exchange, Laissez faire banking, Monetary economics, Fiat money, and Free banking Assujettir: D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information and E42 - Money and interest rates - Monetary systems ; Standards ; Regimes ; Government and the monetary system ; Payment systems -
Creator: Boyd, John H., Prescott, Edward C., and Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 257 Mot-clé: Information structure, Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance environment, Symmetric equilibria, Two stage game, Cooperative equilibrium, and Nash equilibrium Assujettir: D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information and D50 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - General -
Creator: Boyd, John H. and Prescott, Edward C. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 272 La description: "Financial intermediary-coalitions" (WP 272) replaces "Financial intermediaries" (WP 231) and "Father of financial intermediary-coalitions" (WP 250).
Mot-clé: Thrift institutions, Asset transformers, Financial intermediation, Commercial banks, Consumer finance companies, Private information, Core equilibrium, and Loan companies Assujettir: D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information, G21 - Financial institutions and services - Banks ; Other depository institutions ; Micro finance institutions ; Mortgages, and D50 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - General -
Creator: Boyd, John H. and Prescott, Edward C. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 250 La description: "Financial intermediary-coalitions" (WP 272) replaces "Financial intermediaries" (WP 231) and "Father of financial intermediary-coalitions" (WP 250).
Mot-clé: Thrift institutions, Asset transformers, Financial intermediation, Commercial banks, Consumer finance companies, Private information, Core equilibrium, and Loan companies Assujettir: D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information, G21 - Financial institutions and services - Banks ; Other depository institutions ; Micro finance institutions ; Mortgages, and D50 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - General -
Creator: Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 240 Abstract: A model of a labor market is developed in which agents possess private information about their marginal products. As a result, involuntary unemployment may arise as a consequence of attempts by firms to create appropriate self-selection incentives. Moreover, employment lotteries may arise for the same reason despite the fact that, in equilibrium, there is no uncertainty in the model. When employment is random, this is both privately and socially desirable. Finally, it is shown that the unemployment that arises is consistent with (a) pro-cyclical aggregate real wages and productivity, (b) employment that fluctuates (at individual and aggregate levels) much more than real wages. Mot-clé: Private information, Labor market, Employment, and Wages Assujettir: D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information, E24 - Macroeconomics : Consumption, saving, production, employment, and investment - Employment ; Unemployment ; Wages ; Intergenerational income distribution ; Aggregate human capital, and E12 - General aggregative models - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian -
Creator: Levine, David K. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 388 Abstract: Previous authors have argued that the optimal monetary policy is contractionary. If buyers value consumption substantially more than sellers, there is some randomness and informational constraints make asset trading useful, we show that there is an incentive compatible expansionary policy that dominates all incentive compatible contractionary policies. Mot-clé: Expansion, Trade, Optimal monetary policy, Asset trading, Contraction, and Private information Assujettir: D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information and E52 - Monetary policy, central banking, and the supply of money and credit - Monetary policy -
Creator: Altug, Sumru. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 366 La description: Access is limited to authorized users.
Mot-clé: Idiosyncratic risk, Assymetric information , Transaction cost, Private information, Borrowing constraint, Lending, and Market friction Assujettir: D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information and D52 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - Incomplete markets -
Creator: Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 228 Abstract: "Summary of Recommendations: . . . Repeal present control by the System over interest rates that member banks may pay on time deposits and present prohibition of interest payments by member banks on demand deposits." Milton Friedman (1960, p. 100) "I conclude that the over-all monetary effects of ceiling regulations are small and easy to neutralize by traditional monetary controls. The allocative and distributive effects are, however, unfortunate. The root of the policy was an exaggerated and largely unnecessary concern for the technical solvency of savings and loan associations." James Tobin (1970, p. 5) The regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists. The same is true for the original rationale for such regulation: that bank competition for deposits generates inherent "instability" in the banking system. This paper develops an "adverse selection" model of banking in which this rationale is correct. Moreover, in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a "lender of last resort," and despite the absence of any need for "deposit insurance." However, in the world described, the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to "instability" in the banking system. Finally, it is argued that "adverse selection" models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts. Mot-clé: Banking Act, Banking Act of 1933, Banking panics, Banking Act of 1935, Risk, Bank regulation, Instability, and Unregulated banks Assujettir: D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information, E42 - Money and interest rates - Monetary systems ; Standards ; Regimes ; Government and the monetary system ; Payment systems, G11 - General financial markets - Portfolio choice ; Investment decisions, and G21 - Financial institutions and services - Banks ; Other depository institutions ; Micro finance institutions ; Mortgages -
Creator: Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 279 Mot-clé: Unemployment, Private information, Labor, and General equilibrium model Assujettir: D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information, E24 - Macroeconomics : Consumption, saving, production, employment, and investment - Employment ; Unemployment ; Wages ; Intergenerational income distribution ; Aggregate human capital, and D50 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - General -
Creator: Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 232 Abstract: A model of a "real" business cycle is produced in which labor market participants possess private information. A class of economies is considered in which interesting cycles cannot arise without private information. A methodology adapted from Kydland and Prescott (1982) is then employed to show that models based on private information can empirically confront salient features of postwar U.S. business cycles. Moreover, this can be done in a way which is consistent with existing microeconomic evidence on wages and labor supply. Finally, it is shown that the important features of the model related to private information are fairly general. Mot-clé: Unemployment, Labor markets, Assymetric information, and Labor contracts Assujettir: D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information and E32 - Prices, business fluctuations, and cycles - Business fluctuations ; Cycles