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Creator: Prescott, Edward C. and Townsend, Robert M., 1948- Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 203 Abstract:
General competitive analysis is extended to cover a dynamic, pure-exchange economy with privately observed shocks to preferences. In the linear, infinite-dimensional space containing lotteries we establish the existence of optima, the existence of competitive equilibria, and that every competitive equilibrium is an optimum. An example illustrates that rationing and securities with contrived risk have an equilibrium interpretation.
Mot-clé: Lotteries, Competitive equilibria, and Pure exchange Assujettir: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Creator: Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 240 Abstract:
A model of a labor market is developed in which agents possess private information about their marginal products. As a result, involuntary unemployment may arise as a consequence of attempts by firms to create appropriate self-selection incentives. Moreover, employment lotteries may arise for the same reason despite the fact that, in equilibrium, there is no uncertainty in the model. When employment is random, this is both privately and socially desirable. Finally, it is shown that the unemployment that arises is consistent with (a) pro-cyclical aggregate real wages and productivity, (b) employment that fluctuates (at individual and aggregate levels) much more than real wages.
Mot-clé: Labor market, Private information, Wages, and Employment Assujettir: E24 - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity, E12 - General Aggregative Models: Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian, and D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Creator: Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 228 Abstract:
"Summary of Recommendations: . . . Repeal present control by the System over interest rates that member banks may pay on time deposits and present prohibition of interest payments by member banks on demand deposits." Milton Friedman (1960, p. 100) "I conclude that the over-all monetary effects of ceiling regulations are small and easy to neutralize by traditional monetary controls. The allocative and distributive effects are, however, unfortunate. The root of the policy was an exaggerated and largely unnecessary concern for the technical solvency of savings and loan associations." James Tobin (1970, p. 5) The regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists. The same is true for the original rationale for such regulation: that bank competition for deposits generates inherent "instability" in the banking system. This paper develops an "adverse selection" model of banking in which this rationale is correct. Moreover, in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a "lender of last resort," and despite the absence of any need for "deposit insurance." However, in the world described, the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to "instability" in the banking system. Finally, it is argued that "adverse selection" models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts.
Mot-clé: Banking Act, Banking panics, Risk, Instability, Bank regulation, Unregulated banks, Banking Act of 1935, and Banking Act of 1933 Assujettir: G11 - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions, E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems, D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design, and G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Creator: Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 232 Abstract:
A model of a "real" business cycle is produced in which labor market participants possess private information. A class of economies is considered in which interesting cycles cannot arise without private information. A methodology adapted from Kydland and Prescott (1982) is then employed to show that models based on private information can empirically confront salient features of postwar U.S. business cycles. Moreover, this can be done in a way which is consistent with existing microeconomic evidence on wages and labor supply. Finally, it is shown that the important features of the model related to private information are fairly general.
Mot-clé: Labor contracts, Unemployment, Assymetric information, and Labor markets Assujettir: E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles and D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Creator: Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 258 Abstract:
Recent developments in the theory of economies with private information permit a re-examination of the issues raised in the "real bills-quantity theory" debate. A model is developed here in which there are banks, in which fiat money is present, and in which agents possess private information. Two regulatory regimes are then considered. In the first, banks are essentially unregulated. In the second, banks face 100 percent reserve requirements. Issues related to existence and optimality of equilibrium are addressed, and problems with existence are given an interpretation in terms of the "stability" of the banking system. Existence (stability) problems which arise under laissez-faire banking can be rectified by a 100 percent reserve requirement. However, unless there is private information regarding access to investment opportunities, there are typically better ways to accomplish this. Finally, it is shown that even in the presence of 100 percent reserve requirements banks are not simply "money warehouses." Bank deposits and money bear different (real) return streams, even under 100 percent reserves.
Mot-clé: Fiat money, Financial intermediaries, Regulation, Equilibrium, Real bills-quantity theory, and Bank Assujettir: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design and G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Creator: Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 202 Abstract:
A model of credit rationing based on asymmetrically informed borrowers and lenders is developed. In this context, sufficient conditions are derived for an appropriate government policy response to credit rationing to be a continuously open discount window. It is also demonstrated that such a policy can be deflationary, and that given a commitment to operate in this way, the monopoly issue of liabilities can Pareto dominate their competitive issuance.
Mot-clé: Federal lending, Government loans, Jaffee-Russel model, Assymetric information, and Credit limit Assujettir: E51 - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers, H81 - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts, and D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design