Creator: Blandin, Adam, Boyd, John H., and Prescott, Edward C. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 717 Abstract:
We develop an equilibrium concept in the Debreu (1954) theory of value tradition for a class of adverse selection economies which includes the Spence (1973) signaling and Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) insurance environments. The equilibrium exists and is optimal. Further, all equilibria have the same individual type utility vector. The economies are large with a finite number of types that maximize expected utility on an underlying commodity space. An implication of the analysis is that the invisible hand works for this class of adverse selection economies.
Keyword: Insurance, Mutual organization, Adverse selection equilibrium, Theory of value, The core, and Signaling Subject (JEL): G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies, C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium, G29 - Financial Institutions and Services: Other, D46 - Value Theory, and D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Creator: Chari, V. V., Golosov, Mikhail, and Tsyvinski, Aleh Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 673 Abstract:
Innovative activities have public good characteristics in the sense that the cost of producing the innovation is high compared to the cost of producing subsequent units. Moreover, knowledge of how to produce subsequent units is widely known once the innovation has occurred and is, therefore, non-rivalrous. The main question of this paper is whether mechanisms can be found which exploit market information to provide appropriate incentives for innovation. The ability of the mechanism designer to exploit such information depends crucially on the ability of the innovator to manipulate market signals. We show that if the innovator cannot manipulate market signals, then the efficient levels of innovation can be implemented without deadweight losses–for example, by using appropriately designed prizes. If the innovator can use bribes, buybacks, or other ways of manipulating market signals, patents are necessary.
Keyword: Innovations, Mechanism design, Patents, Prizes, and Economic growth Subject (JEL): O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives, D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory, O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital, D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design, O40 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity: General, and D04 - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation, Implementation, and Evaluation
Creator: Ales, Laurence and Maziero, Pricila Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 663 Abstract:
We study the quantitative properties of constrained efficient allocations in an environment where risk sharing is limited by the presence of private information. We consider a life cycle version of a standard Mirrlees economy where shocks to labor productivity have a component that is public information and one that is private information. The presence of private shocks has important implications for the age profiles of consumption and income. First, they introduce an endogenous dispersion of continuation utilities. As a result, consumption inequality rises with age even if the variance of the shocks does not. Second, they introduce an endogenous rise of the distortion on the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure over the life cycle. This is because, as agents age, the ability to properly provide incentives for work must become less and less tied to promises of benefits (through either increased leisure or consumption) in future periods. Both of these features are also present in the data. We look at the data through the lens of our model and estimate the fraction of labor productivity that is private information. We find that for the model and data to be consistent, a large fraction of shocks to labor productivities must be private information.
Keyword: Risk sharing, Private information, and Consumption inequality Subject (JEL): D91 - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making, H21 - Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation, D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory, D58 - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models, D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory, and D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Creator: Zhang, Yuzhe Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 640 Abstract:
In this paper I develop continuous-time methods for solving dynamic principal-agent problems in which the agent’s privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over time. I characterize the optimal contract as the solution to a system of ordinary differential equations, and show that, under this contract, the agent’s utility converges to its lower bound—immiseration occurs. I also show that, unlike in environments with i.i.d. shocks, the principal would like to renegotiate with the agent when the agent’s productivity is low—it is not renegotiation-proof. I apply the theoretical methods I have developed and numerically solve this (Mirrleesian) dynamic taxation model. I find that it is optimal to allow a wedge between the marginal rate of transformation and individuals’ marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. This wedge is significantly higher than what is found in the i.i.d. case. Thus, using the i.i.d. assumption is not a good approximation quantitatively when there is persistence in productivity shocks.
Keyword: Principal-agent problem, Persistence, Efficiency lines, and Stochastic control problem Subject (JEL): E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination, D80 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General, and D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Creator: Katzman, Brett, 1966-, Kennan, John, and Wallace, Neil Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 595 Abstract:
The effects on ex ante optima of a lag in seeing monetary realizations are studied using a matching model of money. The main new ingredient in the model is meetings in which producers have more information than consumers. A consequence is that increases in the amount of money that occur with small enough probability can have negative impact effects on output, because it is optimal to shut down trade in such low probability meetings rather than have lower output when high probability realizations occur. The information lag also produces prices that do not respond much to current monetary realizations.
Subject (JEL): E30 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data), E40 - Money and Interest Rates: General, and D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Creator: Green, Edward J. and Lin, Ping Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 576 Abstract:
In a finite-trader version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model, the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex-post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf. Wallace, 1988), the truth-telling equilibrium implements the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Keyword: Implementation, Financial intermediation, and Bank run Subject (JEL): G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages and D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Creator: Levine, David K. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 388 Abstract:
Previous authors have argued that the optimal monetary policy is contractionary. If buyers value consumption substantially more than sellers, there is some randomness and informational constraints make asset trading useful, we show that there is an incentive compatible expansionary policy that dominates all incentive compatible contractionary policies.
Keyword: Optimal monetary policy, Contraction, Trade, Private information, Asset trading, and Expansion Subject (JEL): D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design and E52 - Monetary Policy
Creator: Williamson, Stephen D. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 382 Abstract:
A model with private information is constructed that supports conventional arguments for a government monopoly in supplying circulating media of exchange. The model also yields predictions, including rate-of-return dominance of circulating media of exchange, that are consistent with observations from free banking regimes and fiat money regimes. In a laissez faire banking equilibrium, fiat money is not valued, and the resulting allocation is not Pareto optimal. However, if private agents are restricted from issuing circulating notes, there exists an equilibrium with valued fiat money that Pareto dominates the laissez faire equilibrium and is constrained Pareto optimal.
Keyword: Currency, Fiat money, Assymetric information, Monetary economics, Monetary exchange, Private information, Laissez faire banking, Free banking, and Money Subject (JEL): D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design and E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Creator: Altug, Sumru Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 366 Keyword: Assymetric information , Lending, Borrowing constraint, Transaction cost, Private information, Market friction, and Idiosyncratic risk Subject (JEL): D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design and D52 - Incomplete Markets