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Creator: Allen, Beth Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 226 Abstract:
This paper surveys implementation theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially in economic environments. After the basic problem is introduced, the theory of implementation is summarized. Some coalitional considerations for implementation problems are discussed. For economies with asymmetric information, cooperative games based on incentive compatibility constraints or Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms are derived and examined.
Mot-clé: Incentive Compatibility, Asymmetric Information, Nontransferable Utility, Incomplete Information, Cooperative Games, Mechanisms, Core, Implementation, and Bayesian-Nash Revelation Principle Assujettir: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design, C72 - Noncooperative Games, C71 - Cooperative Games, D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations, and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies