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Creator: Eichenbaum, Martin S. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 148 Abstract:
A critical roadblock to modelling inventories of finished goods has been the claim that production and inventory decisions of a perfectly competitive firm are determined independently of each other. A basic goal of this study is to specify fundamental preferences of economic agents, technologies, constraints and market structures that are, in a rough way, capable of generating patterns of serial correlation and cross correlation between inventories and employment of factors of production that are consistent with those observed in the data. The claim is made that the time series for inventories, output and employment can be interpreted as emerging from a well specified dynamic, stochastic competitive equilibrium in which economic agents are assumed to form rational expectations about variables not included in their information sets. Inventories and employment will not be related in a direct way if and only if the price elasticity of demand for output is equal to infinity.
Palabra clave: Time series analysis and Competitive equilibrium Tema: C32 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Creator: Townsend, Robert M., 1948- and Wallace, Neil Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 209 Abstract:
We use a model of pure, intertemporal exchange with spatially and information-ally separated markets to explain the existence of private securities which circulate and, hence, play a prominent role in exchange. The model, which utilizes a perfect foresight equilibrium concept, implies that a Schelling-type coordination problem can arise. It can happen that the amounts of circulating securities that are required to support an equilibrium and that are issued at the same time in informationally separated markets must satisfy restrictions not implied by individual maximization and market clearing in each market separately.
Palabra clave: Schelling pure coordination game, Trade, and Debts Tema: G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Creator: Allen, Beth Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 225 Abstract:
This paper surveys cooperative game theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially when the TU and NTU games are derived from economic models. First some results relating balanced games and markets are summarized, including theorems guaranteeing that the core is nonempty. Then the basic pure exchange economy is extended to include asymmetric information. The possibilities for such models to generate cooperative games are examined. Here the core is emphasized as a solution, and criteria are given for its nonemptiness. Finally, an alternative approach is explored based on Harsanyi’s formulation of games with incomplete information.
Palabra clave: Market Games, TU Games, Incomplete Information, NT Games, Core, and Asymmetric Information Tema: D51 - Exchange and Production Economies, D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design, and C71 - Cooperative Games
Creator: Levine, David K. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 386 Abstract:
In a monetary model, it is shown that if there is a unique Pareto inefficient barter equilibrium, then a monetary equilibrium exists when traders are sufficiently patient.
Palabra clave: Money, Monetary equilbria, Inflation, Barter equilibria, and Consumers Tema: E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Creator: Manuelli, Rodolfo E. and Wallace, Neil Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 252 Abstract:
We study an overlapping generations model which contains a capital good that resembles actual gold. This capital good can he stored without physically depreciating and can, by using other resources, be converted back and forth between gold jewelry which yields utility directly and raw gold which does not.Under the assumption that the three utility-yielding objects—first and second period consumption and jewelry—are gross substitutes, stationary equilibria are shown to exist and are characterized; for some parameter values, there are inefficient equilibria, while for others there are efficient equilibria. Both types can be interpreted as commodity money equilibria.
Cover note : "An earlier version of this paper was presented at a seminar at MIT."
Palabra clave: Commodity money system, Commodity money equilibrium, Overlapping generations model, Capital goods, Commodities, and Commodity prices Tema: D51 - Exchange and Production Economies and E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Creator: Prescott, Edward C. and Townsend, Robert M., 1948- Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 203 Abstract:
General competitive analysis is extended to cover a dynamic, pure-exchange economy with privately observed shocks to preferences. In the linear, infinite-dimensional space containing lotteries we establish the existence of optima, the existence of competitive equilibria, and that every competitive equilibrium is an optimum. An example illustrates that rationing and securities with contrived risk have an equilibrium interpretation.
Palabra clave: Lotteries, Competitive equilibria, and Pure exchange Tema: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Creator: Allen, Beth Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 226 Abstract:
This paper surveys implementation theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially in economic environments. After the basic problem is introduced, the theory of implementation is summarized. Some coalitional considerations for implementation problems are discussed. For economies with asymmetric information, cooperative games based on incentive compatibility constraints or Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms are derived and examined.
Palabra clave: Mechanisms, Incentive Compatibility, Bayesian-Nash Revelation Principle, Incomplete Information, Cooperative Games, Core, Implementation, Asymmetric Information, and Nontransferable Utility Tema: C72 - Noncooperative Games, D51 - Exchange and Production Economies, D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design, C71 - Cooperative Games, and D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Creator: Zhou, Ruilin Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 222 Abstract:
This paper investigates the characteristics of stationary single-price equilibrium in a monetary random-matching model where agents can hold an arbitrary amount of divisible money and where production is costly. At such an equilibrium, agents’ money holdings are endogenously determined and uniformly bounded. A refinement of weakly undominated strategies is argued to be necessary. It is shown that a continuum of single-price equilibria indexed by the aggregate real-money balance exists if one such equilibrium exists. Equilibria with different money-holdings upper bounds, hence different distributions, but with identical aggregate real-money balances, can coexist.
Tema: E40 - Money and Interest Rates: General and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Creator: Kehoe, Timothy Jerome, 1953-, Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and Wright, Randall D. Series: Monetary theory and financial intermediation Abstract:
We extend the analysis of Kiyotaki and Wright, who study an economy in which the different commodities that serve as media of exchange are determined endogenously. Kiyotaki and Wright consider only symmetric, steady-state, pure-strategy equilibria, and find that for some parameter values no such equilibria exist. We consider mixed-strategy equilibria and dynamic equilibria. We prove that a steady-state equilibrium exists for all parameter values and that the number of steady-state equilibria is generically finite. We also show, however, that there may be a continuum of dynamic equilibria. Further, some dynamic equilibria display cycles.
Tema: D51 - Exchange and Production Economies and E40 - Money and Interest Rates: General