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Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 175 Abstract: Game theory is both at the heart of economics and without a definitive solution. This paper proposes a solution. It is argued that a dominance criterion generates a, and perhaps the, generalized equilibrium solution for game theory. First we provide a set theoretic perspective from which to view game theory, and then present and discuss the proposed solution.
Motclé: Dominance, Nash equilbrium, and Equilibria Assujettir: C68  Mathematical methods and programming  Computable general equilibrium models, C70  Game theory and bargaining theory  General, and C72  Game theory and bargaining theory  Noncooperative games 
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 155 Abstract: A new approach to market behavior is suggested. This approach has a coherent game theoretic foundaton, addresses such anomalous economic behaviors as strikes, rigid wages and unemployment, regulation of financial markets, depresssion, and nonmarket allocation, and, more generally, provides insights for Finance, Oligopoly Theory, Industrial Organization, and Macroeconomics. The central theme of the approach is that exchange technologies are a basic building block in a model, as are tastes, endowments, and production technologies. Moreover, the key feature of an institution of exchange is that it allows the making of a binding final offer.
Motclé: Bargaining problem, Market behavior, and Competitive allocation Assujettir: D51  General equilibrium and disequilibrium  Exchange and production economies and C72  Game theory and bargaining theory  Noncooperative games 
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 149 Abstract: Game theory addresses a problem which is central to economics. Yet, according to the folklore of economics, game theory has failed. This paper argues that this is an incorrect interpretation of the game theory literature. When faced with a wellposed problem, game theory provides a solution. Procedures for facing game theory with wellposed problems are suggested, and examples of economic applications provided. The applications are Samuelson's fiat money model, Phelps' capital overaccumulation problem, multiple rational expectations equilibria, and a bargaining problem.
Motclé: Competitive equilibrium, MinimaxNash, and Nash equilibrium Assujettir: C72  Game theory and bargaining theory  Noncooperative games 
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 149 Abstract: Game theory addresses a problem which is central to economics. Yet, according to the folklore of economics, game theory has failed. This paper argues that this is an incorrect interpretation of the game theory literature. When faced with a wellposed problem, game theory provides a solution. Procedures for facing game theory with wellposed problems are suggested, and examples of economic applications provided. The applications are Samuelson's fiat money model, Phelps' capital overaccumulation problem, multiple rational expectations equilibria, and a bargaining problem.
Motclé: Competitive equilibrium, MinimaxNash, and Nash equilibrium Assujettir: C72  Game theory and bargaining theory  Noncooperative games 
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 146 Abstract: The determination of the mechanism for ordering strategies in a game theoretic conflict is the keystone of economic science, at least insofar as economics is to remain an outgrowth of that (otherwise relatively minor) school of English philosophy, Utilitarianism. A method for the solution of the general game is presented in this paper, and the implications for economic theorizing discussed.
Motclé: Games, Economic theory, Political economy, Multiple equilibria, and MinimaxNash Assujettir: C72  Game theory and bargaining theory  Noncooperative games and D50  General equilibrium and disequilibrium  General 

Creator: Goenka, Aditya. and Spear, Stephen E. Series: Finance, fluctuations, and development Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic model of general imperfect competition by embedding the ShapleyShubik model of market games into an overlapping generations framework. Existence of an open market equilibrium where there is trading at each post is demonstrated when there are an arbitrary (finite) number of commodities in each period and an arbitrary (finite) number of consumers in each generation. The open market equilibria are fully characterized when there is a single consumption good in each period and it is shown that stationary open market equilibria exist if endowments are not Pareto optimal. Two examples are also given. The first calculates the stationary equilibrium in an economy, and the second shows that the on replicating the economy the stationary equilibria converge to the unique nonautarky stationary equilibrium in the corresponding Walrasian overlapping generations economy. Preliminary ongoing work indicates the possibility of cycles and other fluctuations even in the loglinear economy.
Motclé: Overlapping generations model, General equilibirum theory, and Game theory Assujettir: D91  Intertemporal choice and growth  Intertemporal consumer choice ; Life cycle models and saving, C72  Game theory and bargaining theory  Noncooperative games, and D50  General equilibrium and disequilibrium  General 
