Creator: Williamson, Stephen D. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 382 Abstract:
A model with private information is constructed that supports conventional arguments for a government monopoly in supplying circulating media of exchange. The model also yields predictions, including rate-of-return dominance of circulating media of exchange, that are consistent with observations from free banking regimes and fiat money regimes. In a laissez faire banking equilibrium, fiat money is not valued, and the resulting allocation is not Pareto optimal. However, if private agents are restricted from issuing circulating notes, there exists an equilibrium with valued fiat money that Pareto dominates the laissez faire equilibrium and is constrained Pareto optimal.
Keyword: Currency, Fiat money, Assymetric information, Monetary economics, Monetary exchange, Private information, Laissez faire banking, Free banking, and Money Subject (JEL): D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design and E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Creator: Levine, David K. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 386 Abstract:
In a monetary model, it is shown that if there is a unique Pareto inefficient barter equilibrium, then a monetary equilibrium exists when traders are sufficiently patient.
Keyword: Money, Monetary equilbria, Inflation, Barter equilibria, and Consumers Subject (JEL): E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Creator: Levine, David K. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 388 Abstract:
Previous authors have argued that the optimal monetary policy is contractionary. If buyers value consumption substantially more than sellers, there is some randomness and informational constraints make asset trading useful, we show that there is an incentive compatible expansionary policy that dominates all incentive compatible contractionary policies.
Keyword: Optimal monetary policy, Contraction, Trade, Private information, Asset trading, and Expansion Subject (JEL): D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design and E52 - Monetary Policy
Creator: Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 392 Keyword: Discounted repeated game, Repeated game, Game theory, and Aps example Subject (JEL): C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Creator: Boyd, John H. and Graham, Stanley L. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 398 Abstract:
This study estimates the effects of allowing bank holding companies (BHCs) to enter several lines of financial business not now permitted. A simulation technique is used to estimate the risk and return of hypothetical financial corporations after merger between a BHC and a large firm in each of these industries: securities, real estate, life insurance, property and casualty insurance, and insurance agencies. The study concludes that a merger between a BHC and a life insurance company may decrease the probability of bankruptcy for the merged firm relative to the BHC alone. This result does not hold true, however, for BHC mergers with firms in the other industries. In particular, BHC mergers with securities or real estate firms are found to increase the probability of bankruptcy.
Keyword: Merger, Bank holding companies, Insurance, Real estate, Bankruptcy, Securities, Risk, and Bank holding company Subject (JEL): G28 - Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation, G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill, and G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Creator: Chari, V. V. and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 399 Abstract:
In this paper we analyze the constraints imposed by dynamic consistency in a model of optimal taxation. We assume that only distorting taxes are available to finance government consumption. Optimal fiscal policy requires the use of debt to smooth distortions over time. Dynamic consistency requires that governments at each point in time not have an incentive to default on the inherited debt. We consider policy functions which map the history of the economy including the actions of past governments into current decisions. A sustainable plan is a sequence of history-contingent policies which are optimal at each date given that future policies will be selected according to the plan. We show that if agents discount the future sufficiently little and if government consumption fluctuates then optimal sustainable plans yield policies and allocations which are identical to those under full commitment. We contrast our notion of dynamic consistency with other definitions.
Keyword: Economic policy, Debt, and Fiscal policy Subject (JEL): E62 - Fiscal Policy and E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Creator: Glosten, Lawrence R., Jagannathan, Ravi, and Runkle, David Edward Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 505 Abstract:
Earlier researchers have found either no relation or a positive relation between the conditional expected return and the conditional variance of the monthly excess return on stocks when they used the standard GARCH-M model. This is in contrast to the negative relation found when other approaches were used to model conditional variance. We show that the difference in the estimated relation arises because the standard GARCH-M model is misspecified. When the standard model is modified allow for (i) the presence for seasonal patterns in volatility, (ii) positive and negative innovations to returns to having different impacts on conditional volatility, and (iii) nominal interest rates to affect conditional variance, we once again find support for a negative relation. Using the modified GARCH-M model, we also show that there is little evidence to support the traditional view that conditional volatility is highly persistent. Also, positive unanticipated returns result in a downward revision of the conditional volatility whereas negative unanticipated returns result in an upward revision of conditional volatility of a similar magnitude. Hence the time series properties of the monthly excess return on stocks appear to be substantially different from that of the daily excess return on stocks.
Keyword: Stock market, Rate of return, Risk, Asset valuation, Return rate, and Stocks Subject (JEL): G12 - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates and G11 - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
Creator: Boyd, John H. and Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 512 Abstract:
We investigate ex-ante efficient contracts in an environment in which implementation is costless. In this environment, standard debt contracts will typically not be optimal. Optimal contracts may involve defaults, even in states in which the borrower is fully able to repay. We then examine the welfare costs of arbitrarily restricting the set of feasible contracts to standard debt contracts. When model parameters are calibrated to realistic values, the welfare loss from exogenously imposing this restriction is extremely small. Thus, if the implementation costs are actually nontrivial (as seems likely), standard debt contracts will be (very close to) optimal.
Keyword: CSV, Optimal contract, CESV, Standard debt contract, Ex ante contract, Costly state verification, Loans, Financial contract, Bankruptcy, Costly ex-post state verification, Contracts, and Debt Subject (JEL): G10 - General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) and D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory