||Platt, Glenn J.
||Law and economics of federalism
||This paper develops a model of firm location where communities differ by exogenous endowments of a factor of production. Firms choose to locate based on local subsidies to production. Community and firm optimal strategies are then examined. Through the introduction of information asymmetries about the communities' endowments, equilibrium bidding strategies for communities are found. The results show that auction institutions used by firms may in fact be signaling on the part of communities. These results also indicate that community bids reveal information, and restrictions on this bidding may do more harm than good.
||Tax breaks, Subsidies, Plant location, Tax competition, and Asymmetric information
||H70 - State and local government ; Intergovernmental relations - General, R30 - Production analysis and firm location - General, and D80 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - General