Creator: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957- and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 209 Abstract:
A traditional explanation for why sovereign governments repay debts is that they want to keep good reputations so they can easily borrow more. Bulow and Rogoff show that this argument is invalid under two conditions: (i) there is a single debt relationship, and (ii) regardless of their past actions, governments can earn the (possibly state-contingent) market rate of return by saving abroad. Bulow and Rogoff conjecture that, even under condition (ii), in more general reputation models with multiple relationships and spillover across them, reputation may support debt. This paper shows what is needed for this conjecture to be true.
Keyword: Sovereign Debt, Reputation, Lending crises, Borrowing and lending, and Default Subject (JEL): F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems, E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination, and F00 - International Economics: General