Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.)
Number:
373
Abstract:
This paper presents a simple counterexample to the belief that policy cooperation among benevolent governments is desirable. It also explains circumstances under which such counterexamples are possible and relates them to the literature on time inconsistency.
Description:
Versions of this report were published under the titles “International Policy Cooperation May Be Undesirable” and “Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable.”
Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.)
Number:
373
Abstract:
This paper presents a simple counterexample to the belief that policy cooperation among benevolent governments is desirable. It also explains circumstances under which such counterexamples are possible and relates them to the literature on time inconsistency.
Description:
Versions of this report were published under the titles “International Policy Cooperation May Be Undesirable” and “Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable.”