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Creator: Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 373 Abstract: This paper presents a simple counterexample to the belief that policy cooperation among benevolent governments is desirable. It also explains circumstances under which such counterexamples are possible and relates them to the literature on time inconsistency. Description: Versions of this report were published under the titles “International Policy Cooperation May Be Undesirable” and “Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable.”
Keyword: Policy coordination, Cooperation, Macroeconomics, and Policy games Subject: F11 - Trade - Neoclassical models of trade, F33 - International finance - International monetary arrangements and institutions, and D46 - Market structure and pricing - Value theory -
Creator: Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 373 Abstract: This paper presents a simple counterexample to the belief that policy cooperation among benevolent governments is desirable. It also explains circumstances under which such counterexamples are possible and relates them to the literature on time inconsistency. Description: Versions of this report were published under the titles “International Policy Cooperation May Be Undesirable” and “Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable.”
Keyword: Policy coordination, Cooperation, Macroeconomics, and Policy games Subject: F11 - Trade - Neoclassical models of trade, F33 - International finance - International monetary arrangements and institutions, and D46 - Market structure and pricing - Value theory