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Creator: Hevia, Constantino and Nicolini, Juan Pablo Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 702 Abstract:
We analyze optimal policy in a simple small open economy model with price setting frictions. In particular, we study the optimal response of the nominal exchange rate following a terms of trade shock. We depart from the New Keynesian literature in that we explicitly model interna-tionally traded commodities as intermediate inputs in the production of local final goods and assume that the small open economy takes this price as given. This modification not only is in line with the long-standing tradition of small open economy models, but also changes the optimal movements in the exchange rate. In contrast with the recent small open economy New Keynesian literature, our model is able to reproduce the comovement between the nominal exchange rate and the price of exports, as it has been documented in the commodity currencies literature. Although we show there are preferences for which price stability is optimal even without flexible fiscal instruments, our model suggests that more attention should be given to the coordination between monetary and fiscal policy (taxes) in small open economies that are heavily dependent on exports of commodities. The model we propose is a useful framework in which to study fear of floating.
Mot-clé: Optimal monetary policy, Terms of trade shocks, Devaluations, and Small open economy Assujettir: F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics and E52 - Monetary Policy
Creator: Athey, Susan, Atkeson, Andrew, and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 326 Abstract:
How much discretion should the monetary authority have in setting its policy? This question is analyzed in an economy with an agreed-upon social welfare function that depends on the randomly fluctuating state of the economy. The monetary authority has private information about that state. In the model, well-designed rules trade off society’s desire to give the monetary authority discretion to react to its private information against society’s need to guard against the time inconsistency problem arising from the temptation to stimulate the economy with unexpected inflation. Although this dynamic mechanism design problem seems complex, society can implement the optimal policy simply by legislating an inflation cap that specifies the highest allowable inflation rate. The more severe the time inconsistency problem and the less important is private information, the smaller is the optimal degree of discretion. As either the time inconsistency problem becomes sufficiently severe or private information becomes sufficiently unimportant, the optimal degree of discretion is none.
Mot-clé: Time inconsistency, Inflation caps, Optimal monetary policy, Rules vs. discretion , Activist monetary policy, and Inflation targets Assujettir: E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies, E60 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General, E50 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General, E52 - Monetary Policy, and E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Creator: Chari, V. V., Christiano, Lawrence J., and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 158 Abstract:
We find conditions for the Friedman rule to be optimal in three standard models of money. These conditions are homotheticity and separability assumptions on preferences similar to those in the public finance literature on optimal uniform commodity taxation. We show that there is no connection between our results and the result in the standard public finance literature that intermediate goods should not be taxed.
Mot-clé: Inflation tax, Optimal monetary policy, and Ramsey policy Assujettir: E52 - Monetary Policy, E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination, and E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
Creator: Levine, David K. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 388 Abstract:
Previous authors have argued that the optimal monetary policy is contractionary. If buyers value consumption substantially more than sellers, there is some randomness and informational constraints make asset trading useful, we show that there is an incentive compatible expansionary policy that dominates all incentive compatible contractionary policies.
Mot-clé: Optimal monetary policy, Contraction, Trade, Private information, Asset trading, and Expansion Assujettir: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design and E52 - Monetary Policy