Creator: Allen, Beth Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 226 Abstract:
This paper surveys implementation theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially in economic environments. After the basic problem is introduced, the theory of implementation is summarized. Some coalitional considerations for implementation problems are discussed. For economies with asymmetric information, cooperative games based on incentive compatibility constraints or Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms are derived and examined.
Keyword: Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, Cooperative Games, Core, Nontransferable Utility, Asymmetric Information, Mechanisms, Bayesian-Nash Revelation Principle, and Implementation Subject (JEL): D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design, D51 - Exchange and Production Economies, D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations, C72 - Noncooperative Games, and C71 - Cooperative Games