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Creator: Chari, V. V., Golosov, Mikhail, and Tsyvinski, Aleh Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 673 Abstract:
Innovative activities have public good characteristics in the sense that the cost of producing the innovation is high compared to the cost of producing subsequent units. Moreover, knowledge of how to produce subsequent units is widely known once the innovation has occurred and is, therefore, non-rivalrous. The main question of this paper is whether mechanisms can be found which exploit market information to provide appropriate incentives for innovation. The ability of the mechanism designer to exploit such information depends crucially on the ability of the innovator to manipulate market signals. We show that if the innovator cannot manipulate market signals, then the efficient levels of innovation can be implemented without deadweight losses–for example, by using appropriately designed prizes. If the innovator can use bribes, buybacks, or other ways of manipulating market signals, patents are necessary.
Palavra-chave: Economic growth, Mechanism design, Prizes, Patents, and Innovations Sujeito: O40 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity: General, O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital, O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives, D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory, D04 - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation, Implementation, and Evaluation, and D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Creator: Fernandes, Ana and Phelan, Christopher Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 259 Abstract:
There is now an extensive literature regarding the efficient design of incentive mechanisms in dynamic environments. In this literature, there are no exogenous links across time periods because either privately observed shocks are assumed time independent or past private actions have no influence on the realizations of current variables. The absence of exogenous links across time periods ensures that preferences over continuation contracts are common knowledge, making the definition of incentive compatible contracts at a point in time a simple matter. In this paper, we present general recursive methods to handle environments where privately observed variables are linked over time. We show that incentive compatible contracts are implemented recursively with a threat keeping constraint in addition to the usual temporary incentive compatibility conditions.
Palavra-chave: Repeated agency and Mechanism design Sujeito: D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions, D30 - Distribution: General, D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design, and D80 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General