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Creator: Bengui, Julien and Bianchi, Javier Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 754 Abstract:
The outreach of macroprudential policies is likely limited in practice by imperfect regulation enforcement, whether due to shadow banking, regulatory arbitrage, or other regulation circumvention schemes. We study how such concerns affect the design of optimal regulatory policy in a workhorse model in which pecuniary externalities call for macroprudential taxes on debt, but with the addition of a novel constraint that financial regulators lack the ability to enforce taxes on a subset of agents. While regulated agents reduce risk taking in response to debt taxes, unregulated agents react to the safer environment by taking on more risk. These leakages undermine the effectiveness of macroprudential taxes but do not necessarily call for weaker interventions. A quantitative analysis of the model suggests that aggregate welfare gains and reductions in the severity and frequency of financial crises remain, on average, largely unaffected by even significant leakages.
Palabra clave: Financial crises, Regulatory arbitrage, Macroprudential policy, and Limited regulation enforcement Tema: F32 - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements, E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles, D62 - Externalities, E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy, and F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics
Creator: Bianchi, Javier Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 730 Abstract:
We develop a quantitative equilibrium model of financial crises to assess the interaction between ex-post interventions in credit markets and the buildup of risk ex ante. During a systemic crisis, bailouts relax balance sheet constraints and mitigate the severity of the recession. Ex ante, the anticipation of such bailouts leads to an increase in risk-taking, making the economy more vulnerable to a financial crisis. We find that moral hazard effects are limited if bailouts are systemic and broad-based. If bailouts are idiosyncratic and targeted, however, this makes the economy significantly more exposed to financial crises.
Palabra clave: Financial shocks, Credit crunch, Macroprudential policy, and Moral hazard Tema: E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles, E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy, G18 - General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation, and F40 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance: General
Creator: Arce, Fernando, Bengui, Julien, and Bianchi, Javier Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 761 Abstract:
This paper proposes a theory of foreign reserves as macroprudential policy. We study an open economy model of financial crises, in which pecuniary externalities lead to over-borrowing, and show that by accumulating international reserves, the government can achieve the constrained-efficient allocation. The optimal reserve accumulation policy leans against the wind and significantly reduces the exposure to financial crises. The theory is consistent with the joint dynamics of private and official capital flows, both over time and in the cross section, and can quantitatively account for the recent upward trend in international reserves.
Palabra clave: Macroprudential policy, Financial crises, and International reserves Tema: E00 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics: General, F00 - International Economics: General, and G00 - Financial Economics: General