Risultati della ricerca
Creator: Schlegl, Matthias, Trebesch, Christoph, and Wright, Mark L. J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 759 Abstract:
Sovereign governments owe debt to many foreign creditors and can choose which creditors to favor when making payments. This paper documents the de facto seniority structure of sovereign debt using new data on defaults (missed payments or arrears) and creditor losses in debt restructuring (haircuts). We overturn conventional wisdom by showing that official bilateral (government-to-government) debt is junior, or at least not senior, to private sovereign debt such as bank loans and bonds. Private creditors are typically paid first and lose less than bilateral official creditors. We confirm that multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank are senior creditors.
Parola chiave: Sovereign default, IMF, International financial architecture, Pecking order, Insolvency, Official debt, Sovereign bonds, Arrears, and Priority Soggetto: G10 - General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data), F30 - International Finance: General, F50 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy: General, and F40 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance: General