Creator: Alvarez, Fernando, 1964- and Jermann, Urban J. Series: Endogenous incompleteness Abstract:
We study the asset pricing implications of a multi-agent endowment economy where agents can default on debt. We build on the environment studied by Kocherlakota (1995) and Kehoe and Levine (1993). We present an equilibrium concept for an economy with complete markets and with endogenous solvency constraints. These solvency constraints prevent default, but at the cost of reduced risk sharing. We show that versions of the classical welfare theorems hold for this equilibrium definition. We characterize the pricing kernel, and compare it to the one for economies without participation constraints: interest rates are lower and risk premia depend on the covariance of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.
Keyword: Equilibrium, Default, Solvency constraints, Risk, Shocks, and Assets Subject (JEL): G12 - General financial markets - Asset pricing ; Trading volume ; Bond interest rates and D50 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - General
Creator: Coleman, Wilbur John. Series: Nonlinear rational expectations modeling group Abstract:
A cash-in-advance constraint on consumption is incorporated into a standard model of consumption and capital accumulation. Monetary policy consists of lump-sum cash transfers. Methods are developed for establishing the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. and for explicitly constructing this equilibrium. The model economy's dependence on monetary policy is explored.
Also published in the International Finance Discussion Paper series, number 323.
Keyword: Equilibrium, Planned Growth economy, and Monetary Growth economy Subject (JEL): E31 - Prices, business fluctuations, and cycles - Price level ; Inflation ; Deflation, O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models, O42 - Economic growth and aggregate productivity - Monetary growth models, and E52 - Monetary policy, central banking, and the supply of money and credit - Monetary policy
Creator: Azariadis, Costas. and Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Finance, fluctuations, and development Abstract:
We study a variant of the one-sector neoclassical growth model of Diamond in which capital investment must be credit financed, and an adverse selection problem appears in loan markets. The result is that the unfettered operation of credit markets leads to a one-dimensional indeterminacy of equilibrium. Many equilibria display economic fluctuations which do not vanish asymptotically; such equilibria are characterized by transitions between a Walrasian regime in which the adverse selection problem does not matter, and a regime of credit rationing in which it does. Moreover, for some configurations of parameters, all equilibria display such transitions for two reasons. One, the banking system imposes ceilings on credit when the economy expands and floors when it contracts because the quality of public information about the applicant pool of potential borrowers is negatively correlated with the demand for credit. Two, depositors believe that returns on bank deposits will be low (or high): these beliefs lead them to transfer savings out of (into) the banking system and into less (more) productive uses. The associated disintermediation (or its opposite) causes banks to contract (expand) credit. The result is a set of equilibrium interest rates on loans that validate depositors' original beliefs. We investigate the existence of perfect foresight equilibria displaying periodic (possibly asymmetric) cycles that consist of m periods of expansion followed by n periods of contraction, and propose an algorithm that detects all such cycles.
Keyword: Interest rates, Equilibrium, Credit markets, and Business cycles Subject (JEL): E51 - Monetary policy, central banking, and the supply of money and credit - Money supply ; Credit ; Money multipliers, E44 - Money and interest rates - Financial markets and the macroeconomy, O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models, and E32 - Prices, business fluctuations, and cycles - Business fluctuations ; Cycles
Creator: Prescott, Edward C. and Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor Series: Advances in dynamic economics Abstract:
A necessary feature for equilibrium is that beliefs about the behavior of other agents are rational. We argue that in stationary OLG environments this implies that any future generation in the same situation as the initial generation must do as well as the initial generation did in that situation. We conclude that the existing equilibrium concepts in the literature do not satisfy this condition. We then propose an alternative equilibrium concept, organizational equilibrium, that satisfies this condition. We show that equilibrium exists, it is unique, and it improves over autarky without achieving optimality. Moreover, the equilibrium can be readily found by solving a maximization program.
Keyword: Rational behavior, Equilibrium, and Overlapping generations Subject (JEL): D51 - Exchange and Production Economies and E13 - General Aggregative Models: Neoclassical