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Creator: Gane, Samuel H. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 161 Keyword: Monopoly, Anticompetitive behavior, Oligarchy, and Competition Subject: K21 - Regulation and business law - Antitrust law, L40 - Antitrust issues and policies - General, and G28 - Financial institutions and services - Government policy and regulation -
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 92 Keyword: Price setting and Competition Subject: D41 - Market structure and pricing - Perfect competition -
Creator: Henczel, Don. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 51 Keyword: Financial institutions, Competition, and Electronic funds transfer at point of sale Subject: O33 - Technological change ; Research and development - Technological change : Choices and consequences ; Diffusion processes and G21 - Financial institutions and services - Banks ; Other depository institutions ; Micro finance institutions ; Mortgages -
Creator: Townsend, Robert M., 1948- Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 80 Abstract: This paper focuses on avoidable moral hazard and offers one explanation for limited insurance markets, for closely held firms, and for seemingly simple as opposed to contingent forms of debt. Agents have random endowments of a consumption good which are such that there are gains to trading contingent claims. But any realization of an endowment is known only by its owner unless a verification cost is borne. Contracts in such a setting are said to be consistent if agents submit to verification and honor claims in accordance with prior agreements. The Pareto optimal consistent contracts which emerge are shown to have familiar characteristics. Keyword: Contracts, General equilibrium theory, Avoidable moral hazard, and Competition Subject: D86 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Economics of contract : Theory, D50 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - General, D61 - Welfare economics - Allocative efficiency ; Cost-benefit analysis, and D11 - Household behavior and family economics - Consumer economics : Theory -
Creator: Chari, V. V. and Jones, Larry E. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 324 Abstract: This paper examines the validity of one very special version of Coase's Theorem. The version we examine is that in any economy in which the property rights are fully allocated, competition will lead to efficient allocations. One repercussion of this result is that one way to "solve" the public goods problem would be to allocate property rights fully, transforming the economy to a private goods one and let markets do their work. This is particularly appealing due to its decentralized nature, but one must question the claim that the market will lead to efficient outcomes in this case. That is, the privatized economy created above is of a very special type which, as it turns out is highly susceptible to strategic behavior. We show that the "mechanism" suggested above is not likely to work well in economies with either pure public goods or "global" externalities. Basically, the free-rider problem manifests itself as one of monopoly power in this private goods setting. On the other hand, if the public goods or externalities are "local" in nature, there is reason to hope that this (and perhaps other) mechanism(s) will work well. The work is related to the recent literature on the foundations of Walrasian Equilibrium in that it points up a relationship between the appropriateness of Walrasian equilibrium as a solution concept, the incentives for strategic play, the aggregate level of complementarities in the economy and the problem of coordinating economic activity. Keyword: Walrasian Equilibrium, Property rights, Coase's Theorem, Competition, and Coordinating economic activity Subject: H41 - Publicly provided goods - Public goods -
Creator: Townsend, Robert M., 1948- Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 80 Abstract: This paper focuses on avoidable moral hazard and offers one explanation for limited insurance markets, for closely held firms, and for seemingly simple as opposed to contingent forms of debt. Agents have random endowments of a consumption good which are such that there are gains to trading contingent claims. But any realization of an endowment is known only by its owner unless a verification cost is borne. Contracts in such a setting are said to be consistent if agents submit to verification and honor claims in accordance with prior agreements. The Pareto optimal consistent contracts which emerge are shown to have familiar characteristics. Keyword: Contracts, General equilibrium theory, Avoidable moral hazard, and Competition Subject: D86 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Economics of contract : Theory, D50 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - General, D61 - Welfare economics - Allocative efficiency ; Cost-benefit analysis, and D11 - Household behavior and family economics - Consumer economics : Theory -
Creator: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957- and Ohanian, Lee E. Series: Great depressions of the twentieth century Abstract: There are two striking aspects of the recovery from the Great Depression in the United States: the recovery was very weak and real wages in several sectors rose significantly above trend. These data contrast sharply with neoclassical theory, which predicts a strong recovery with low real wages. We evaluate whether New Deal cartelization policies designed to limit competition among firms and increase labor bargaining power can account for the persistence of the Depression. We develop a model of the intraindustry bargaining process between labor and firms that occurred with these policies, and embed that model within a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model. We find that New Deal cartelization policies are an important factor in accounting for the post-1933 Depression. We also find that the key depressing element of New Deal policies was not collusion per se, but rather the link between paying high wages and collusion. Keyword: New Deal, Great Depression, Competition, Cartels, Wages, and Collective bargaining Subject: D50 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - General and J58 - Labor-management relations, trade unions, and collective bargaining - Public policy