Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 168 Abstract:
A simple model of backed money without a store of value function is presented, discussed, and defended. The function of money in the model is to replace complex contingent contracts traded on a centralized exchange with simple trades in decentralized markets.
Keyword: Fiat money, Commodity money, and Contracts Subject (JEL): C10 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General and E40 - Money and Interest Rates: General
Creator: Redish, Angela, 1952- and Weber, Warren E. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 658 Abstract:
Commodity money standards in medieval and early modern Europe were characterized by recurring complaints of small change shortages and by numerous debasements of the coinage. To confront these facts, we build a random matching monetary model with two indivisible coins with different intrinsic values. The model shows that small change shortages can exist in the sense that changes in the size of the small coin affect ex ante welfare. Further, the optimal ratio of coin sizes is shown to depend upon the trading opportunities in a country and a country’s wealth. Thus, coinage debasements can be interpreted as optimal responses to changes in fundamentals. Further, the model shows that replacing full-bodied small coins with tokens is not necessarily welfare-improving.
Keyword: Random matching, Commodity money, Optimal denominations, and Gresham's Law
Creator: Lagos, Ricardo and Rocheteau, Guillaume Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 341 Abstract:
We construct a model where capital competes with fiat money as a medium of exchange, and we establish conditions on fundamentals under which fiat money can be both valued and socially beneficial. When the socially efficient stock of capital is too low to provide the liquidity agents need, they overaccumulate productive assets to use as media of exchange. When this is the case, there exists a monetary equilibrium that dominates the nonmonetary one in terms of welfare. Under the Friedman Rule, fiat money provides just enough liquidity so that agents choose to accumulate the same capital stock a social planner would.
Keyword: Fiat money and Commodity money Subject (JEL): E52 - Monetary Policy, E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems, and E41 - Demand for Money
Creator: Velde, François R., Weber, Warren E., and Wright, Randall D. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 215 Abstract:
We develop a model of commodity money and use it to analyze the following two questions motivated by issues in monetary history: What are the conditions under which Gresham’s Law holds? And, what are the mechanics of a debasement (lowering the metallic content of coins)? The model contains light and heavy coins, imperfect information, and prices determined via bilateral bargaining. There are equilibria with neither, both, or only one type of coin in circulation. When both circulate, coins may trade by weight or by tale. We discuss the extent to which Gresham’s Law holds in the various cases. Following a debasement, the quantity of reminting depends on the incentives offered by the sovereign. Equilibria exist with positive seigniorage and a mixture of old and new coins in circulation.
Keyword: Asymmetric information, Random matching, Gresham's Law, Debasement, and Commodity money Subject (JEL): E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems and N10 - Economic History: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations: General, International, or Comparative