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Creator: Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 and Wang, Cheng Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 574 Abstract:
We consider the problem of an insurer who enters into a repeated relationship with a set of risk averse agents in the presence of ex post verification costs. The insurer wishes to minimize the expected cost of providing these agents a certain expected utility level. We characterize the optimal contract between the insurer and the insured agents. We then apply the analysis to the provision of deposit insurance. Our results suggest—in a deposit insurance context—that it may be optimal to utilize the discount window early on, and to make deposit insurance payments only later, or not at all.
Mot-clé: Deposit insurance and Bank supervision Assujettir: E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies and G20 - Financial Institutions and Services: General