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Creator: Allen, Beth Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 226 Abstract:
This paper surveys implementation theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially in economic environments. After the basic problem is introduced, the theory of implementation is summarized. Some coalitional considerations for implementation problems are discussed. For economies with asymmetric information, cooperative games based on incentive compatibility constraints or Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms are derived and examined.
Palabra clave: Incentive Compatibility, Asymmetric Information, Nontransferable Utility, Incomplete Information, Cooperative Games, Mechanisms, Core, Implementation, and Bayesian-Nash Revelation Principle Tema: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design, C72 - Noncooperative Games, C71 - Cooperative Games, D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations, and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Creator: Allen, Beth Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 225 Abstract:
This paper surveys cooperative game theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially when the TU and NTU games are derived from economic models. First some results relating balanced games and markets are summarized, including theorems guaranteeing that the core is nonempty. Then the basic pure exchange economy is extended to include asymmetric information. The possibilities for such models to generate cooperative games are examined. Here the core is emphasized as a solution, and criteria are given for its nonemptiness. Finally, an alternative approach is explored based on Harsanyi’s formulation of games with incomplete information.
Palabra clave: Market Games, Asymmetric Information, Incomplete Information, Core, TU Games, and NT Games Tema: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design, C71 - Cooperative Games, and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Creator: Hopenhayn, Hugo Andres, Llobet, Gerard, and Mitchell, Matt Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 273 Abstract:
This paper presents a model of cumulative innovation where firms are heterogeneous in their research ability. We study the optimal reward policy when the quality of the ideas and their subsequent development effort are private information. The optimal assignment of property rights must counterbalance the incentives of current and future innovators. The resulting mechanism resembles a menu of patents that have infinite duration and fixed scope, where the latter increases in the value of the idea. Finally, we provide a way to implement this patent menu by using a simple buyout scheme: The innovator commits at the outset to a price ceiling at which he will sell his rights to a future inventor. By paying a larger fee initially, a higher price ceiling is obtained. Any subsequent innovator must pay this price and purchase its own buyout fee contract.
Palabra clave: Asymmetric Information, Mechanism Design, Compulsory Licensing, Patents, Innovation, Policy, and Sequential Innovation Tema: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design, K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law, O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives, D43 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection, L51 - Economics of Regulation, L50 - Regulation and Industrial Policy: General, and H41 - Public Goods