Research Database

Spatial differences in labor market performance are large and highly persistent. Using data from the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, we document striking similarities across these countries in the spatial differences in unemployment, vacancies, and job filling, finding, and separation rates. The novel facts on the geography of vacancies and job filling are instrumental in guiding and disciplining the development of a theory of local labor market performance. We find that a spatial version of a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model with endogenous separations and on-the-job search quantitatively accounts for all the documented empirical regularities. The model also quantitatively rationalizes why differences in job-separation rates have primary importance in inducing differences in unemployment across space while changes in the job-finding rate are the main driver in unemployment fluctuations over the business cycle.

This paper measures the output costs of sovereign risk by combining a sovereign debt model with firm- and bank-level data. An increase in sovereign risk lowers the price of government debt and has an adverse impact on banks’ balance sheets, disrupting their ability to finance firms. The resulting fall in credit supply impacts firms directly, as they need to borrow at higher interest rates, and indirectly through general equilibrium effects on the price of inputs and other goods. Importantly, firms are not equally affected by these developments: those that have greater financing needs and that borrow from banks that hold more government debt are mostly affected by the change in borrowing rates, while firms that do not borrow are only impacted indirectly. We show that these direct and indirect effects can be recovered using a firm-level regression, which we estimate using Italian data. We calibrate our model to match the measured firm-level elasticities and find that heightened sovereign risk was responsible for one-third of the observed output decline during the Italian debt crisis.

This paper characterizes the allocations that emerge in general equilibrium economies populated by households with preferences of the additive random utility type that make discrete consumption, employment or spatial decisions. We start with a complete markets economy where households can trade claims contingent upon the realizations of their preference shocks. We (i) establish a first and second welfare theorem, (ii) illustrate that in the absence of ex-ante trade, discrete choice economies are generically inefficient, (iii) show that complete markets are not necessary and a much smaller set of securities decentralizes the efficient allocation. We illustrate the relevance of these results in several canonical settings and for measuring how welfare changes in response to changes in prices.

A weakening of labor protection policies is often invoked as one cause of observed monopsony power and the decline in labor’s share of income, but little evidence exists on the causal impact of labor policies on wage markdowns. Using confidential Mexican economic census data from 1994 to 2019, we document a rising trend over this period in on-site outsourcing. Then, leveraging data from a manufacturing panel survey from 2013 to 2023 and a natural experiment featuring a ban on domestic outsourcing in 2021, we show that the ban drastically reduced outsourcing, increased wages, and reduced measured markdowns without lowering output or employment. Consistent with the presence of monopsony power, we observe large markdowns for the largest firms, with the decline in markdowns in response to the ban concentrated among high-markdown firms. However, we also find that the reform reduced capital investment and increased the probability of market exit.

Financial integration generates macroeconomic spillovers that may require international monetary policy coordination. We show that individual central banks may set nominal interest rates too low or too high relative to the cooperative outcome. We identify three sufficient statistics that determine whether the Nash equilibrium exhibits under-tightening or over-tightening: the output gap, sectoral differences in labor intensity, and the trade balance response to changes in nominal rates. Independently of the shocks hitting the economy, we find that under-tightening is possible during economic expansions or contractions. For large shocks, the gains from coordination can be substantial.