In a general equilibrium setting, we study versions of the proposal to pay interest on reserves at the market rate. We argue that the proposal makes the demand for total reserves indeterminate whether interest is paid on total reserves or on required reserves only. One consequence is that tax financing of the proposal gives rise to a continuum of equilibria, equilibria which differ in real returns and consumption allocations. Another consequence is that an attempt to finance the proposal through earnings on the central bank’s portfolio either gives rise to an equilibrium with a zero nominal interest rate or fails to give rise to an equilibrium.

In a general equilibrium setting, we study versions of the proposal to pay interest on reserves at the market rate. We argue that the proposal makes the demand for total reserves indeterminate whether interest is paid on total reserves or on required reserves only. One consequence is that tax financing of the proposal gives rise to a continuum of equilibria, equilibria which differ in real returns and consumption allocations. Another consequence is that an attempt to finance the proposal through earnings on the central bank’s portfolio either gives rise to an equilibrium with a zero nominal interest rate or fails to give rise to an equilibrium.

A random matching model with money is used to study the nominal yield on small denomination, bearer, safe, discount securities issued by the government. There is always one steady state with matured securities circulating at par and, for some parameters, another with them circulating at a discount. In the former, a necessary and sufficient condition for a positive nominal yield on not-yet-matured securities is exogenous discriminatory treatment of them by the government. In the latter, the post-maturity discount on securities induces a deeper pre-maturity discount even without such discriminatory treatment.