Creator: Townsend, Robert M., 1948- and Wallace, Neil Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 209 Abstract:
We use a model of pure, intertemporal exchange with spatially and information-ally separated markets to explain the existence of private securities which circulate and, hence, play a prominent role in exchange. The model, which utilizes a perfect foresight equilibrium concept, implies that a Schelling-type coordination problem can arise. It can happen that the amounts of circulating securities that are required to support an equilibrium and that are issued at the same time in informationally separated markets must satisfy restrictions not implied by individual maximization and market clearing in each market separately.
Keyword: Schelling pure coordination game, Trade, and Debts Subject (JEL): G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies