Creator: Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 228 Abstract:
"Summary of Recommendations: . . . Repeal present control by the System over interest rates that member banks may pay on time deposits and present prohibition of interest payments by member banks on demand deposits." Milton Friedman (1960, p. 100) "I conclude that the over-all monetary effects of ceiling regulations are small and easy to neutralize by traditional monetary controls. The allocative and distributive effects are, however, unfortunate. The root of the policy was an exaggerated and largely unnecessary concern for the technical solvency of savings and loan associations." James Tobin (1970, p. 5) The regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists. The same is true for the original rationale for such regulation: that bank competition for deposits generates inherent "instability" in the banking system. This paper develops an "adverse selection" model of banking in which this rationale is correct. Moreover, in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a "lender of last resort," and despite the absence of any need for "deposit insurance." However, in the world described, the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to "instability" in the banking system. Finally, it is argued that "adverse selection" models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts.
Keyword: Banking Act, Banking Act of 1933, Banking panics, Banking Act of 1935, Risk, Bank regulation, Instability, and Unregulated banks Subject (JEL): D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information, E42 - Money and interest rates - Monetary systems ; Standards ; Regimes ; Government and the monetary system ; Payment systems, G11 - General financial markets - Portfolio choice ; Investment decisions, and G21 - Financial institutions and services - Banks ; Other depository institutions ; Micro finance institutions ; Mortgages
Creator: Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 232 Abstract:
A model of a "real" business cycle is produced in which labor market participants possess private information. A class of economies is considered in which interesting cycles cannot arise without private information. A methodology adapted from Kydland and Prescott (1982) is then employed to show that models based on private information can empirically confront salient features of postwar U.S. business cycles. Moreover, this can be done in a way which is consistent with existing microeconomic evidence on wages and labor supply. Finally, it is shown that the important features of the model related to private information are fairly general.
Keyword: Unemployment, Labor markets, Assymetric information, and Labor contracts Subject (JEL): D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information and E32 - Prices, business fluctuations, and cycles - Business fluctuations ; Cycles
Creator: Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 221 Abstract:
This paper considers a view commonly associated with the "quantity theory of money": that banks should face 100 percent reserve requirements. It argues first that the objectives of the quantity theorists' proposals were more than merely price level stability, and that in fact, price level stability was at most a secondary objective of their proposals. Second, it argues that these theorists had a world with distortions in mind with respect to their proposals. These are present in a special setting examined that (a) supports the imposition of 100 percent reserve requirements (on the basis of an unconstrained Pareto criterion), and (b) supports the view that these restrictions stabilize the price level and make its movements more "predictable."
Keyword: Loans, Quantity-theory, Quantity theory, Price level stability, Banks, and Lending Subject (JEL): E31 - Prices, business fluctuations, and cycles - Price level ; Inflation ; Deflation and G28 - Financial institutions and services - Government policy and regulation
Creator: Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 237 Abstract:
A model is presented in which governments can select real expenditure levels which are feasible, hut are sufficiently high that a balanced budget is impossible. Thus governments with large expenditures are committed to inflationary finance schemes. This is the case even though the governments in question have access to lump-sum taxes. In addition, the model can explain why poorer countries tend to make heavier use of the inflation tax than do wealthier countries, and can account for the existence of country-specific fiat monies.
Keyword: Real expenditures, Government expenditure, Inflationary finance, Deficit, and Inflation tax Subject (JEL): H50 - National government expenditures and related policies - General, H62 - National budget, deficit, and debt - Deficit ; Surplus, and E31 - Prices, business fluctuations, and cycles - Price level ; Inflation ; Deflation
Creator: Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 202 Abstract:
A model of credit rationing based on asymmetrically informed borrowers and lenders is developed. In this context, sufficient conditions are derived for an appropriate government policy response to credit rationing to be a continuously open discount window. It is also demonstrated that such a policy can be deflationary, and that given a commitment to operate in this way, the monopoly issue of liabilities can Pareto dominate their competitive issuance.
Keyword: Government loans, Assymetric information, Jaffee-Russel model, Credit limit, and Federal lending Subject (JEL): D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information, H81 - Miscellaneous issues - Governmental loans, loan guarantees, credits, and grants, and E51 - Monetary policy, central banking, and the supply of money and credit - Money supply ; Credit ; Money multipliers
Creator: Boyd, John H. and Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 512 Abstract:
We investigate ex-ante efficient contracts in an environment in which implementation is costless. In this environment, standard debt contracts will typically not be optimal. Optimal contracts may involve defaults, even in states in which the borrower is fully able to repay. We then examine the welfare costs of arbitrarily restricting the set of feasible contracts to standard debt contracts. When model parameters are calibrated to realistic values, the welfare loss from exogenously imposing this restriction is extremely small. Thus, if the implementation costs are actually nontrivial (as seems likely), standard debt contracts will be (very close to) optimal.
Keyword: CESV, CSV, Debt, Contracts, Standard debt contract, Costly ex-post state verification, Bankruptcy, Optimal contract, Ex ante contract, Financial contract, Loans, and Costly state verification Subject (JEL): D86 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Economics of contract : Theory and G10 - General financial markets - General
Creator: Boyd, John H. and Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 522 Abstract:
We consider a two country growth model with international capital markets. These markets fund capital investment in both countries, and operate subject to a costly state verification (CSV) problem. Investors in each country require some external finance, but also provide internal finance, which mitigates the CSV problem. When two identical (except for their initial capital stocks) economies are closed, they necessarily converge monotonically to the same steady state output level. Unrestricted international financial trade precludes otherwise identical economies from converging, and poor countries are necessarily net lenders to rich countries. Oscillation in real activity and international capital flows can occur.
Keyword: CSV, International lending, Capital investment, Credit rationing, International capital markets, Credit, Costly state verification, Closed economy, and Open economy Subject (JEL): O16 - Economic development - Financial markets ; Saving and capital investment ; Corporate finance and governance and F34 - International finance - International lending and debt problems