Creator: Asturias, Jose, Hur, Sewon, Kehoe, Timothy Jerome, 1953-, and Ruhl, Kim J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 544 Abstract:
Applying the Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (FHK) (2001) decomposition to plant-level manufacturing data from Chile and Korea, we find that the entry and exit of plants account for a larger fraction of aggregate productivity growth during periods of fast GDP growth. Studies of other countries confirm this empirical relationship. To analyze this relationship, we develop a simple model of firm entry and exit based on Hopenhayn (1992) in which there are analytical expressions for the FHK decomposition. When we introduce reforms that reduce entry costs or reduce barriers to technology adoption into a calibrated model, we find that the entry and exit terms in the FHK decomposition become more important as GDP grows rapidly, just as they do in the data from Chile and Korea.
Keyword: Entry costs, Entry, Exit, Productivity, and Barriers to technology adoption Subject (JEL): O10 - Economic Development: General, E22 - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity, O38 - Technological Change: Government Policy, and O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
Creator: Asturias, Jose, Hur, Sewon, Kehoe, Timothy Jerome, 1953-, and Ruhl, Kim J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 521 Abstract:
In what order should a developing country adopt policy reforms? Do some policies complement each other? Do others substitute for each other? To address these questions, we develop a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with entry and exit of firms that are monopolistic competitors. Distortions in the model include barriers to entry of firms, barriers to international trade, and barriers to contract enforcement. We find that a reform that reduces one of these distortions has different effects depending on the other distortions present. In particular, reforms to trade barriers and barriers to the entry of new firms are substitutable, as are reforms to contract enforcement and trade barriers. In contrast, reforms to contract enforcement and the barriers to entry are complementary. Finally, the optimal sequencing of reforms requires reforming trade barriers before contract enforcement.
Keyword: Trade barriers, Sequencing reforms, Contract enforcement, and Entry barriers Subject (JEL): O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development, F13 - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations, O24 - Development Planning and Policy: Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy, F40 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance: General, and O19 - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations