Prediction interval tests are applied to the reduced forms of two quarterly models of the U.S. (the "old" FRB-MIT model and the Michigan model). The results illustrate the range of tests one can perform on an estimated simultaneous equation model. In particular, the tests determine whether ex post forecast errors can be attributed to structural deficiencies of the models. The paper examines confidence regions and other aspects of forecast distributions-comparisons between mean forecasts and nonstochastic forecasts, comparisons between, forecast variances from multiperiod endogenous simulations and those from one period simulations, and comparisons between forecast variances and residual variances.

This paper was written for the National Bureau of Economic Research Macro Conference to be held July 7 and 8, 1983, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Before the establishment of federal deposit insurance, the U.S. experienced periodic banking panics, during which banks suspended specie payments and reduced lending. There was often a corresponding economic slowdown. The Panic of 1837 is considered one of the worst banking panics, and it coincided with a slowdown that lasted for almost five years. The economic disruption was not uniform across the country, however. The slowdown in New England was substantially less severe than elsewhere. Here we suggest that the Suffolk Bank, a private bank, was one reason for New England’s relative success. We argue that the Suffolk Bank’s provision of note-clearing and lender of last resort services (via the Suffolk Banking System) lessened the effects of the Panic of 1837 in New England relative to the rest of the country, where no bank provided such services.

The best-known example of a privately created and well-functioning interbank payments system is the Suffolk Banking System. Operating in New England between 1825 and 1858, it was the first regionwide net-clearing system for bank notes in the United States. Some historians portray the System as being owned and managed by a coalition of large Boston banks in order to achieve a public purpose. They argue that while the System was not particularly profitable, it maintained par circulation of bank notes throughout the region. We reconsider this history and find the public-purpose view of the Suffolk Banking System to be specious. The System was owned and operated solely by the Suffolk Bank. It was operated not to promote a common currency or any other public purpose, but to serve the private interests of the Suffolk Bank’s shareholders, which it did quite successfully.

The classic example of a privately created and well-functioning interbank payments system is the Suffolk Banking System that existed in New England between 1825 and 1858. This System, operated by the Suffolk Bank, was the first regionwide net-clearing system for bank notes in the United States. While it operated, notes of all New England banks circulated at par throughout the region. The achievements of the System have led some to conclude that unfettered competition in the provision of payments services can produce an efficient payments system. In this paper, we reexamine the history of the Suffolk Banking System and present some facts that call this conclusion into question. We find that the Suffolk Bank earned extraordinary profits and that note clearing may have been a natural monopoly. There is no consensus in the literature about whether unfettered operation of markets in the presence of natural monopolies produces an efficient allocation.

This paper establishes the stylized fact that medieval debasements were accompanied by unusually large minting volumes and revenues. This fact is a puzzle under the commonly held view that metallic coins are commodity money and exchange by weight. An existing explanation is that debased coins were used to reduce the real burden of nominally denominated debts. This explanation is logically flawed: nothing prevents agents from renegotiating contracts and avoid incurring minting costs. The paper also establishes other facts about monetary mutations, which altogether pose a challenge to monetary economics.