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Creator: Bianchi, Javier and Mondragon, Jorge Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 755 Abstract:
This paper shows that the inability to use monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilization leaves a government more vulnerable to a rollover crisis. We study a sovereign default model with self-fulfilling rollover crises, foreign currency debt, and nominal rigidities. When the government lacks monetary autonomy, lenders anticipate that the government will face a severe recession in the event of a liquidity crisis, and are therefore more prone to run on government bonds. By contrast, a government with monetary autonomy can stabilize the economy and can easily remain immune to a rollover crisis. In a quantitative application, we find that the lack of monetary autonomy played a central role in making the Eurozone vulnerable to a rollover crisis. A lender of last resort can help ease the costs from giving up monetary independence.
Palabra clave: Sovereign debt crises, Rollover risk, and Monetary unions Tema: E50 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General, G15 - International Financial Markets, F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems, and E40 - Money and Interest Rates: General