Creator: Marshall, Robert and Merlo, Antonio Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 220 Abstract:
Many unions in the United States have for several years engaged in what is known as pattern bargaining—a union determines a sequence for negotiations with firms within an industry where the agreement with the first firm becomes the take-it-or-leave-it offer by the union for all subsequent negotiations. In this paper, we show that pattern bargaining is preferred by a union to both simultaneous industrywide negotiations and sequential negotiations without a pattern. In recent years, unions have increasingly moved away from patterns that equalized wage rates across firms when these patterns did not equalize interfirm labor costs. Allowing for interfirm productivity differentials within an industry, we show that for small interfirm productivity differentials, the union most prefers a pattern in wages, but for a sufficiently wide differential, the union prefers a pattern in labor costs.
学科: J50 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General and L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Creator: Echevarria, Cristina and Merlo, Antonio Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 195 Abstract:
We interpret observed gender differences in education as the equilibrium outcome of a two-sex overlapping generations model where men and women of each generation bargain over consumption, number of children, and investment in education of their children conditional on gender. This model represents a new framework for the analysis of the process of intrahousehold decision making in an intergenerational setting.
Creator: İmrohoroglu, Ayşe Ökten, Merlo, Antonio, and Rupert, Peter Charles, 1952- Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 216 Abstract:
In this paper we propose a general equilibrium model where heterogeneous agents specialize either in legitimate market activities or in criminal activities and majority rule determines the share of income redistributed and the expenditures devoted to the apprehension of criminals. We calibrate our model to the U.S. economy in 1990, and we conduct simulation exercises to evaluate the effectiveness of expenditures on police protection and income redistribution at reducing crime. We find that while expenditures on police protection reduce crime, it is possible for the crime rate to increase with redistribution. We also show that economies that adopt relatively more generous redistribution policies may have either higher or lower crime rates than economies with relatively less generous redistribution policies, depending on the characteristics of their wage distribution and on the efficiency of their apprehension technology.
学科: D58 - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models, K14 - Criminal Law, and J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity