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Creator: Hopenhayn, Hugo Andres, Llobet, Gerard, and Mitchell, Matt Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 273 Abstract:
This paper presents a model of cumulative innovation where firms are heterogeneous in their research ability. We study the optimal reward policy when the quality of the ideas and their subsequent development effort are private information. The optimal assignment of property rights must counterbalance the incentives of current and future innovators. The resulting mechanism resembles a menu of patents that have infinite duration and fixed scope, where the latter increases in the value of the idea. Finally, we provide a way to implement this patent menu by using a simple buyout scheme: The innovator commits at the outset to a price ceiling at which he will sell his rights to a future inventor. By paying a larger fee initially, a higher price ceiling is obtained. Any subsequent innovator must pay this price and purchase its own buyout fee contract.
Palabra clave: Asymmetric Information, Mechanism Design, Compulsory Licensing, Patents, Innovation, Policy, and Sequential Innovation Tema: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design, K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law, O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives, D43 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection, L51 - Economics of Regulation, L50 - Regulation and Industrial Policy: General, and H41 - Public Goods