Creator: Green, Edward J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 501 Abstract:
I consider two theories of the determination of political institutions. One of these theories stresses effects of changes in the balance of military power between the ruler and subjects on the distribution of property rights which the political system enforces. The other theory emphasizes the effect of changing informational constraints which require institutional changes to be made in order to maintain efficiency. I examine how each of these theories would apply to explaining the development of parliamentary government in thirteenth-century England. My general conclusion is that both theories are required to understand fully the process by which liberal political institutions emerge.
Keyword: History, England, Great Britain, and Government Subject (JEL): H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government and N43 - Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: Europe: Pre-1913
Creator: Green, Edward J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 509 Abstract:
Thinking regarding the privatization of state industries and enterprises in the former Comecon countries has tended to focus on the efficiency gains that would occur in the privatized sector. Based on the comparatively good performance and the rather rigid configuration of Comecon production institutions, the scope for such productivity gains seems small. Rather, productivity and innovation in the post-Comecon economies are likely to depend greatly on the emergence of new, initially small, entrepreneurial firms. The extent and form of privatization may affect these firms' prospects for success. How the privatized-firm and entrepreneurial sector will interact depends on public-finance considerations as well as on considerations of industrial organization.
Keyword: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, State enterprise, Growth, Private enterprise, Eastern bloc, Comecon, Entrepreneurship, Soviet bloc, and Privatization Subject (JEL): L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices, L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out, and G38 - Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
Creator: Green, Edward J. and Oh, Soo-Nam Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 499 Abstract:
In this paper we explain why markets in noncontingent debt securities might be a stable form of market organization for intermediation to households. Efficient-contract allocation might be supported by these markets because households' relationships with their intermediaries do not exactly parallel the explicit form of the noncontingent contracts that they explicitly sign with one another. Also we show that the efficient-contract model can be distinguished from alternative models within the time-series framework that has been widely used to study households' consumption patterns.
Paper prepared for the 'Debt and Credit' Conference at the LSE.
Keyword: Debt securities, Credit, Consumption, Households, and Credit contracts Subject (JEL): C22 - Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes, D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory, and G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages