Creator: Green, Edward J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 501 Abstract:
I consider two theories of the determination of political institutions. One of these theories stresses effects of changes in the balance of military power between the ruler and subjects on the distribution of property rights which the political system enforces. The other theory emphasizes the effect of changing informational constraints which require institutional changes to be made in order to maintain efficiency. I examine how each of these theories would apply to explaining the development of parliamentary government in thirteenth-century England. My general conclusion is that both theories are required to understand fully the process by which liberal political institutions emerge.
Stichwort: History, Government, England, and Great Britain Fach: N43 - Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: Europe: Pre-1913 and H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Creator: Green, Edward J. and Oh, Soo-Nam Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 499 Abstract:
In this paper we explain why markets in noncontingent debt securities might be a stable form of market organization for intermediation to households. Efficient-contract allocation might be supported by these markets because households' relationships with their intermediaries do not exactly parallel the explicit form of the noncontingent contracts that they explicitly sign with one another. Also we show that the efficient-contract model can be distinguished from alternative models within the time-series framework that has been widely used to study households' consumption patterns.
Paper prepared for the 'Debt and Credit' Conference at the LSE.
Stichwort: Households, Credit contracts, Consumption, Credit, and Debt securities Fach: G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages, C22 - Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes, and D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
Creator: Green, Edward J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 509 Abstract:
Thinking regarding the privatization of state industries and enterprises in the former Comecon countries has tended to focus on the efficiency gains that would occur in the privatized sector. Based on the comparatively good performance and the rather rigid configuration of Comecon production institutions, the scope for such productivity gains seems small. Rather, productivity and innovation in the post-Comecon economies are likely to depend greatly on the emergence of new, initially small, entrepreneurial firms. The extent and form of privatization may affect these firms' prospects for success. How the privatized-firm and entrepreneurial sector will interact depends on public-finance considerations as well as on considerations of industrial organization.
Stichwort: Soviet bloc, Entrepreneurship, State enterprise, Comecon, Eastern bloc, Privatization, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Private enterprise, and Growth Fach: G38 - Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation, L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices, and L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
Creator: Fujiki, Hiroshi, Green, Edward J., and Yamazaki, Akira, 1942 Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 594 Abstract:
Two policies toward payments-system risk are common, but superficially appear to be contradictory. One policy is to restrict the exposure to risk generated by one participant to other participants who are, by one measure or another, directly concerned with the risky participant. The other policy is to provide a “safety net,” typically provided by government and funded by taxes collected from all participants and even from non-participants, to share losses due to “systemic risk.” In this paper, we provide a model in which both of these policies can be constituents of an economically efficient regime of payments-risk management.
Creator: Green, Edward J. and Lin, Ping Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 576 Abstract:
In a finite-trader version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model, the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex-post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf. Wallace, 1988), the truth-telling equilibrium implements the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Stichwort: Implementation, Financial intermediation, and Bank run Fach: G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages and D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Creator: Green, Edward J. and Weber, Warren E. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 571 Abstract:
A current U.S. policy is to introduce a new style of currency that is harder to counterfeit, but not immediately to withdraw from circulation all of the old-style currency. This policy is analyzed in a random-matching model of money, and its potential to decrease counterfeiting in the long run is shown. For various parameters of the model, three types of equilibria are found to occur. In only one does counterfeiting continue at its initial high level. In the other two, both genuine and counterfeit old-style money go out of circulation—immediately in one and gradually in the other. There are objectives and expectations that can reasonably be imputed to policymakers, under which the policy that they have chosen can make sense.
Creator: Green, Edward J. and Park, In-Uck Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 558 Abstract:
An intuitively natural consistency condition for contingent plans is necessary and sufficient for a contingent plan to be rationalized by maximization of conditional expected utility. One alternative theory of choice under uncertainty, the weighted-utility theory developed by Chew Soo Hong (1983) does not entail that contingent plans will generally satisfy this condition. Another alternative theory, the minimax theory as formulated by Savage (1972), does entail the consistency condition (at least for singleton-valued plans).
Creator: Green, Edward J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 144 Abstract:
Intuitively, a patient trader should be able to make his trading partners compete to reveal whatever information is relevant to their transactions with him. This possibility is examined in the context of a model resembling that of Gale (1986). The main result is that, under assumptions having to do with asset structure and spanning, incentive-compatible elicitation of trading partners’ knowledge is feasible.
Creator: Green, Edward J. and Oh, Soo-Nam Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 143 Abstract:
The paper compares implications of three kinds of models of households’ consumption behavior: the basic permanent-income model, several models of liquidity-constrained households, and a model of an informationally-constrained efficient contract. These models are distinguished in terms of implications regarding the present discounted values of net trades to households at various levels of temporary income, and the households’ marginal rates of substitution. Martingale consumption is studied as an approximation to the predicted consumption process of the efficient-contract model.