Creator: Champ, Bruce, Wallace, Neil, and Weber, Warren E. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 161 Abstract:
According to previous studies, the demand-liability feature of national bank notes did not present a problem for note-issuing banks because the nonbank public treated notes and other currency as perfect substitutes. However, that view, when combined with nonbindingness of the collateral restriction against note issue, itself an implication of the fact that some eligible collateral was not used for that purpose, implies that the safe short-term interest rate is pegged at the tax rate on note circulation. Since evidence on short-term interest rates is inconsistent with such a peg, that view must be rejected.
关键词: Bank notes, National banking system, and Interest rates 学科: N21 - Economic History: Financial Markets and Institutions: U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913 and E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Creator: Champ, Bruce, Wallace, Neil, and Weber, Warren E. Series: Quarterly review (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: Vol. 16, No. 2 Abstract:
During the 1882–1914 period, U.S. national banks could issue circulating notes backed by specified government securities. Earlier attempts to explain yields on those securities by costs of note issue discovered a paradox: yields were too high. We point out two previously ignored sources of costs: idle notes and note redemptions that were highly variable, thereby exacerbating the problem of managing reserves. We present data on idle notes and estimate, from partial data on redemptions, the uncertainty due to redemptions. We also present a semiannual time series of an upper bound on the average additional return on equity a national bank would earn by fully using its note issue privilege. Since the median of this series is 0.5 percent and since this upper bound does not include the average costs stemming from the exacerbated reserve management problem, we conclude that the specified government securities did not have paradoxically high yields.