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Creator: Bryant, John B. and Wallace, Neil Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 051 Abstract:
Monetary policy is analyzed within a model that ignores transaction costs and appeals solely to legal restrictions on private intermediation to explain the coexistence of currency and interest-bearing default-free bonds. The interaction between such legal restrictions and monetary policy is illustrated in versions of overlapping generations models that contain three assets: government-issued currency and bonds and real capital. It is shown that legal restrictions and the use of both currency and bonds permit the government to levy a discriminatory inflation tax and that such a tax may be better in terms of the Pareto criterion than a uniform inflation tax.
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 175 Abstract:
Game theory is both at the heart of economics and without a definitive solution. This paper proposes a solution. It is argued that a dominance criterion generates a, and perhaps the, generalized equilibrium solution for game theory. First we provide a set theoretic perspective from which to view game theory, and then present and discuss the proposed solution.
Palabra clave: Nash equilbrium, Dominance, and Equilibria Tema: C72 - Noncooperative Games, C68 - Computable General Equilibrium Models, and C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 168 Abstract:
A simple model of backed money without a store of value function is presented, discussed, and defended. The function of money in the model is to replace complex contingent contracts traded on a centralized exchange with simple trades in decentralized markets.
Palabra clave: Fiat money, Commodity money, and Contracts Tema: C10 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General and E40 - Money and Interest Rates: General
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 177 Descripción:
"Nominal labor contracts replicate net of tax real contracts contingent on aggregate risk in the model presented. Perhaps this is a model of money." (title page note)
Palabra clave: Wages, Income tax, Labor economics, and Inflation tax Tema: C68 - Computable General Equilibrium Models and J41 - Labor Contracts
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 057 Abstract:
Iterated contraction by dominance produces a generalized equilibrium. This solution to game theory is motivated, generated, analyzed, and compared to Nash equilibrium. One implication drawn is that a realized event in a social situation need not be uniquely determined by simple individual choices, even though the preference orderings implying those choices are the appropriate primitive.
Creator: Bryant, John B. and Wallace, Neil Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 062 Abstract:
Our suggestion consists of three postulates: assets are valued only in terms of their payoffs, perfect foresight, and complete and costless markets under laissez-faire. Together these postulates imply that the crucial anomaly, rate-of-return dominance of “money,” is to be explained by legal restrictions.
Our defense of these postulates is two-fold. First we compare them with existing alternative theories. Second, we provide an illustrative model which : (a) is consistent with the postulates, (b) implies rate-of-return dominance under suitable legal restrictions, and (c) addresses monetary policy questions with standard welfare economics and, in particular, rationalizes in terms of price discrimination a debt management policy that “tailors debt issues to the needs of the market.”
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 056 Abstract:
The recurrent banking panics of the 19th century and the Great Depression of the 1930s are widely viewed as failures of our economic system. A simple version of Samuelson’s overlapping generations model is used to generate such failures of Walrasian equilibrium. The spontaneous “panics” generated involve a collapse of bank credit, causing in turn a drop in investment demand. The model suggests that both the recent technological advances in the intermediation industry and the current move towards deregulation of that industry are ominous developments.
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 155 Abstract:
A new approach to market behavior is suggested. This approach has a coherent game theoretic foundaton, addresses such anomalous economic behaviors as strikes, rigid wages and unemployment, regulation of financial markets, depresssion, and nonmarket allocation, and, more generally, provides insights for Finance, Oligopoly Theory, Industrial Organization, and Macroeconomics. The central theme of the approach is that exchange technologies are a basic building block in a model, as are tastes, endowments, and production technologies. Moreover, the key feature of an institution of exchange is that it allows the making of a binding final offer.
Palabra clave: Competitive allocation, Market behavior, and Bargaining problem Tema: C72 - Noncooperative Games and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies