Herein, it is demonstrated that the competitive provision of fiat money is generically either inefficient or infeasible.

An alternative solution concept is recommended for noncooperative games with multiple equilibra. Players maximize security level in a contracted game. Examples in economics are given in which this solution concept yields a unique solution: a fiat money model, the capital overaccumulation problem, and multiple rational expectations equilibria generally.

A simple model of backed money without a store of value function is presented, discussed, and defended. The function of money in the model is to replace complex contingent contracts traded on a centralized exchange with simple trades in decentralized markets.

Game theory addresses a problem which is central to economics. Yet, according to the folklore of economics, game theory has failed. This paper argues that this is an incorrect interpretation of the game theory literature. When faced with a well-posed problem, game theory provides a solution. Procedures for facing game theory with well-posed problems are suggested, and examples of economic applications provided. The applications are Samuelson's fiat money model, Phelps' capital overaccumulation problem, multiple rational expectations equilibria, and a bargaining problem.