Creator: Atkeson, Andrew, Eisfeldt, Andrea L., Weill, Pierre-Olivier, and d'Avernas, Adrien Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 567 Abstract:
Banks' ratio of the market value to book value of their equity was close to 1 until the 1990s, then more than doubled during the 1996-2007 period, and fell again to values close to 1 after the 2008 financial crisis. Sarin and Summers (2016) and Chousakos and Gorton (2017) argue that the drop in banks' market-to-book ratio since the crisis is due to a loss in bank franchise value or profitability. In this paper we argue that banks' market-to-book ratio is the sum of two components: franchise value and the value of government guarantees. We empirically decompose the ratio between these two components and find that a large portion of the variation in this ratio over time is due to changes in the value of government guarantees.
Stichwort: Bank financial soundness, Bank leverage, Bank valuation, Banking, Bank regulation, and Risk shifting Fach: E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy, H12 - Crisis Management, G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill, G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages, G38 - Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation, and G28 - Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Creator: Atkeson, Andrew, Eisfeldt, Andrea L., and Weill, Pierre-Olivier Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 479 Abstract:
We develop a model of equilibrium entry, trade, and price formation in over-the-counter (OTC) markets. Banks trade derivatives to share an aggregate risk subject to two trading frictions: they must pay a fixed entry cost, and they must limit the size of the positions taken by their traders because of risk-management concerns. Although all banks in our model are endowed with access to the same trading technology, some large banks endogenously arise as “dealers,” trading mainly to provide intermediation services, while medium sized banks endogenously participate as “customers” mainly to share risks. We use the model to address positive questions regarding the growth in OTC markets as trading frictions decline, and normative questions of how regulation of entry impacts welfare.
Stichwort: Networks, Entry, Welfare, Asset pricing, Trading limits, and Bargaining Fach: G23 - Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors, G20 - Financial Institutions and Services: General, L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks, and G28 - Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation