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Creator: Ales, Laurence and Maziero, Pricila Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 663 Abstract:
We study the quantitative properties of constrained efficient allocations in an environment where risk sharing is limited by the presence of private information. We consider a life cycle version of a standard Mirrlees economy where shocks to labor productivity have a component that is public information and one that is private information. The presence of private shocks has important implications for the age profiles of consumption and income. First, they introduce an endogenous dispersion of continuation utilities. As a result, consumption inequality rises with age even if the variance of the shocks does not. Second, they introduce an endogenous rise of the distortion on the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure over the life cycle. This is because, as agents age, the ability to properly provide incentives for work must become less and less tied to promises of benefits (through either increased leisure or consumption) in future periods. Both of these features are also present in the data. We look at the data through the lens of our model and estimate the fraction of labor productivity that is private information. We find that for the model and data to be consistent, a large fraction of shocks to labor productivities must be private information.
Palavra-chave: Risk sharing, Private information, and Consumption inequality Sujeito: D91 - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making, H21 - Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation, D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory, D58 - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models, D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory, and D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Creator: Ales, Laurence, Carapella, Francesca, Maziero, Pricila, and Weber, Warren E. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 641 Abstract:
Prior to 1863, state-chartered banks in the United States issued notes–dollar-denominated promises to pay specie to the bearer on demand. Although these notes circulated at par locally, they usually were quoted at a discount outside the local area. These discounts varied by both the location of the bank and the location where the discount was being quoted. Further, these discounts were asymmetric across locations, meaning that the discounts quoted in location A on the notes of banks in location B generally differed from the discounts quoted in location B on the notes of banks in location A. Also, discounts generally increased when banks suspended payments on their notes. In this paper we construct a random matching model to qualitatively match these facts about banknote discounts. To attempt to account for locational differences, the model has agents that come from two distinct locations. Each location also has bankers that can issue notes. Banknotes are accepted in exchange because banks are required to produce when a banknote is presented for redemption and their past actions are public information. Overall, the model delivers predictions consistent with the behavior of discounts.
Palavra-chave: Banknotes, Random matching, and Banks Sujeito: G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages, N21 - Economic History: Financial Markets and Institutions: U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913, and E50 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General