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Creator: Aguiar, Mark, Amador, Manuel, and Arellano, Cristina Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 625 Abstract: We provide sufficient conditions for the feasibility of a Pareto-improving fiscal policy when the risk-free interest rate on government bonds is below the growth rate (r < g) or there is a markup between price and marginal cost. We do so in the class of incomplete markets models pioneered by Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari, but we allow for an arbitrary amount of ex ante heterogeneity in terms of preferences and income risk. We consider both the case of dynamic inefficiency as well as the more plausible case of dynamic efficiency. The key condition is that seigniorage revenue raised by government bonds exceeds the increase in the interest rate times the initial capital stock. The Pareto improving fiscal policies weakly expand every agent's budget set at every point in time. The policies improve risk sharing and potentially guide the economy to a more efficient level of capital. We establish that debt and investment associated with Pareto improving policies along the transition may be complements, rather than the traditional substitutes.
Keyword: Government debt, Low interest rates, Fiscal policy, and Heterogeneous agents Subject (JEL): H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General, E20 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy: General (includes Measurement and Data), and D20 - Production and Organizations: General -
Creator: Aguiar, Mark, Amador, Manuel, Farhi, Emmanuel, and Gopinath, Gita, 1971- Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 511 Abstract: We study fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union with the potential for rollover crises in sovereign debt markets. Member-country fiscal authorities lack commitment to repay their debt and choose fiscal policy independently. A common monetary authority chooses inflation for the union, also without commitment. We first describe the existence of a fiscal externality that arises in the presence of limited commitment and leads countries to over-borrow; this externality rationalizes the imposition of debt ceilings in a monetary union. We then investigate the impact of the composition of debt in a monetary union, that is the fraction of high-debt versus low-debt members, on the occurrence of self-fulfilling debt crises. We demonstrate that a high-debt country may be less vulnerable to crises and have higher welfare when it belongs to a union with an intermediate mix of high- and low-debt members, than one where all other members are low-debt. This contrasts with the conventional wisdom that all countries should prefer a union with low-debt members, as such a union can credibly deliver low inflation. These findings shed new light on the criteria for an optimal currency area in the presence of rollover crises.
Keyword: Monetary union, Debt crisis, Fiscal policy , and Coordination failures Subject (JEL): E40 - Money and Interest Rates: General, F40 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance: General, E50 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General, and F30 - International Finance: General -
Creator: Aguiar, Mark and Amador, Manuel Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 518 Abstract: We study optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy (SOE) with sovereign and private default risk and limited commitment to tax plans. The SOE's government uses linear taxation to fund exogenous expenditures and uses public debt to inter-temporally allocate tax distortions. We characterize a class of environments in which the tax on labor goes to zero in the long run, while the tax on capital income may be non-zero, reversing the standard prediction of the Ramsey tax literature. The zero labor tax is an optimal long run outcome if the economy is subject to sovereign debt constraints and the domestic households are impatient relative to the international interest rate. The front loading of tax distortions allows the economy to build a large (aggregate) debt position in the presence of limited commitment. We show that a similar result holds in a closed economy with imperfect inter-generational altruism, providing a link with the closed-economy literature that has explored disagreement between the government and its citizens regarding inter-temporal tradeoffs.
Keyword: Limited commitment, Sovereign debt, and Fiscal policy Subject (JEL): F38 - International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls, F32 - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements, F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems, and E62 - Fiscal Policy -
Creator: Aguiar, Mark and Amador, Manuel Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 565 Abstract: We establish that creditor beliefs regarding future borrowing can be self-fulfilling, leading to multiple equilibria with markedly different debt accumulation patterns. We characterize such indeterminacy in the Eaton-Gersovitz sovereign debt model augmented with long maturity bonds. Two necessary conditions for the multiplicity are: (i) the government is more impatient than foreign creditors, and (ii) there are deadweight losses from default; both are realistic and standard assumptions in the quantitative literature. The multiplicity is dynamic and stems from the self-fulfilling beliefs of how future creditors will price bonds; long maturity bonds are therefore a crucial component of the multiplicity. We introduce a third party with deep pockets to discuss the policy implications of this source of multiplicity and identify the potentially perverse consequences of traditional “lender of last resort” policies.
Keyword: Sovereign debt, Debt dilution, Self-fulfilling debt crises, and Multiple equilibria Subject (JEL): F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems