Creator: Crone, Theodore M. and Mills, Leonard O. (Leonard Orion), 1960- Series: System committee on agriculture and rural development Abstract:
Cointegration tests are used to examine the basic long-term relation between population and the housing stock. There is some weak evidence of a long-run relation between the constant-cost value of the housing stock and population-driven demand. Much stronger evidence exists for a long-term relation between owner-occupied housing units and the adult population. We generally cannot reject that the number of housing units intended for owner-occupancy has adjusted in proportion to the population 25 years of age and older. Using these results and current population projections, we produce trend forecasts through the year 2010 for the owner-occupied housing stock and single-family housing starts in the U.S.
Keyword: Population, Demographics, and Housing Subject (JEL): J11 - Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts ; General Migration and R31: Housing Supply and Markets
Creator: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957- and Ohanian, Lee E. Series: Great depressions of the twentieth century Abstract:
There are two striking aspects of the recovery from the Great Depression in the United States: the recovery was very weak and real wages in several sectors rose significantly above trend. These data contrast sharply with neoclassical theory, which predicts a strong recovery with low real wages. We evaluate whether New Deal cartelization policies designed to limit competition among firms and increase labor bargaining power can account for the persistence of the Depression. We develop a model of the intraindustry bargaining process between labor and firms that occurred with these policies, and embed that model within a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model. We find that New Deal cartelization policies are an important factor in accounting for the post-1933 Depression. We also find that the key depressing element of New Deal policies was not collusion per se, but rather the link between paying high wages and collusion.
Keyword: New Deal, Great Depression, Competition, Cartels, Wages, and Collective bargaining Subject (JEL): D50 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - General and J58 - Labor-management relations, trade unions, and collective bargaining - Public policy
Creator: Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus. and Rubio-Ramírez, Juan Francisco. Series: Joint committee on business and financial analysis Abstract:
This paper presents a method to perform likelihood-based inference in nonlinear dynamic equilibrium economies. This type of models has become a standard tool in quantitative economics. However, existing literature has been forced so far to use moment procedures or linearization techniques to estimate these models. This situation is unsatisfactory: moment procedures suffer from strong small samples biases and linearization depends crucially on the shape of the true policy functions, possibly leading to erroneous answers. We propose the use of Sequential Monte Carlo methods to evaluate the likelihood function implied by the model. Then we can perform likelihood-based inference, either searching for a maximum (Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation) or simulating the posterior using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm (Bayesian Estimation). We can also compare different models even if they are nonnested and misspecified. To perform classical model selection, we follow Vuong (1989) and use the Kullback-Leibler distance to build Likelihood Ratio Tests. To perform Bayesian model comparison, we build Bayes factors. As an application, we estimate the stochastic neoclassical growth model.
Keyword: Likelihood-based inference, Dynamic equilibrium economies, Sequential Monte Carlo methods, and Nonlinear filtering Subject (JEL): C15 - Statistical Simulation Methods: General, C13 - Estimation: General, C10 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General, and C11 - Bayesian Analysis: General
Creator: Mulligan, Casey B. Series: Great depressions of the twentieth century Abstract:
I prove some theorems for competitive equilibria in the presence of distortionary taxes and other restraints of trade, and use those theorems to motivate an algorithm for (exactly) computing and empirically evaluating competitive equilibria in dynamic economies. Although its economics is relatively sophisticated, the algorithm is so computationally economical that it can be implemented with a few lines in a spreadsheet. Although a competitive equilibrium models interactions between all sectors, all consumer types, and all time periods, I show how my algorithm permits separate empirical evaluation of these pieces of the model and hence is practical even when very little data is available. For similar reasons, these evaluations are not particularly sensitive to how data is partitioned into "trends" and "cycles." I then compute a real business cycle model with distortionary taxes that fits aggregate U.S. time series for the period 1929-50 and conclude that, if it is to explain aggregate behavior during the period, government policy must have heavily taxed labor income during the Great Depression and lightly taxed it during the war. In other words, the challenge for the competitive equilibrium approach is not so much why output might change over time, but why the marginal product of labor and the marginal value of leisure diverged so much and why that wedge persisted so long. In this sense, explaining aggregate behavior during the period has been reduced to a public finance question - were actual government policies distorting behavior in the same direction and magnitude as government policies in the model?
Keyword: Depressions, Taxes, World War 2, and Competitive equilibrium models Subject (JEL): H30 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General, E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles, and C68 - Computable General Equilibrium Models
Creator: Azariadis, Costas. and Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Finance, fluctuations, and development Abstract:
We study a variant of the one-sector neoclassical growth model of Diamond in which capital investment must be credit financed, and an adverse selection problem appears in loan markets. The result is that the unfettered operation of credit markets leads to a one-dimensional indeterminacy of equilibrium. Many equilibria display economic fluctuations which do not vanish asymptotically; such equilibria are characterized by transitions between a Walrasian regime in which the adverse selection problem does not matter, and a regime of credit rationing in which it does. Moreover, for some configurations of parameters, all equilibria display such transitions for two reasons. One, the banking system imposes ceilings on credit when the economy expands and floors when it contracts because the quality of public information about the applicant pool of potential borrowers is negatively correlated with the demand for credit. Two, depositors believe that returns on bank deposits will be low (or high): these beliefs lead them to transfer savings out of (into) the banking system and into less (more) productive uses. The associated disintermediation (or its opposite) causes banks to contract (expand) credit. The result is a set of equilibrium interest rates on loans that validate depositors' original beliefs. We investigate the existence of perfect foresight equilibria displaying periodic (possibly asymmetric) cycles that consist of m periods of expansion followed by n periods of contraction, and propose an algorithm that detects all such cycles.
Keyword: Interest rates, Equilibrium, Credit markets, and Business cycles Subject (JEL): E51 - Monetary policy, central banking, and the supply of money and credit - Money supply ; Credit ; Money multipliers, E44 - Money and interest rates - Financial markets and the macroeconomy, O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models, and E32 - Prices, business fluctuations, and cycles - Business fluctuations ; Cycles
Creator: Aiyagari, S. Rao, Wallace, Neil, and Wright, Randall Series: Lucas expectations anniversary conference Abstract:
A pairwise random meeting model with money is used to study the nominal yield on pure-discount, default-free securities that are issued by the government. There is one steady state with matured securities at par and, for some parameters, another with them at a discount. In the former, exogenous rejection of unmatured securities by the government is necessary and sufficient for such a steady state to display a positive nominal yield on unmatured securities. In the latter, the post-maturity discount on securities induces a deeper pre-maturity discount even if there is no exogenous rejection of unmatured securities.
Keyword: Maturity, Government securities, and Interest rates Subject (JEL): E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy and E43 - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects