Research Database

We provide sufficient conditions for the feasibility of robust Pareto-improving (RPI) fiscal policies in the class of incomplete markets models of Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari and when the interest rate on government debt is below the growth rate (r < g). We allow for arbitrary heterogeneity in preferences and income risk and a potential wedge between the return to capital and to government bonds. An RPI improves risk sharing and can induce a more efficient level of capital. We show that the elasticities of aggregate savings to changes in interest rates are the crucial ingredients that determine the feasibility of RPIs. We establish that government debt and capital investment associated with an RPI may be complements along the transition, rather than the traditional substitutes. Our analysis shifts the focus of fiscal policy in incomplete markets from explicitly redistributive policies to using government bonds and simple subsidies to robustly improve welfare of all agents at all points in time.

A persistent rise in rents has kept inflation above target in many advanced economies. Optimal policy in the standard New Keynesian (NK) model requires policy to stabilize housing inflation. We argue that the basic architecture of the NK model—that excess demand is always satisfied by producers—is inappropriate for the housing market, and we develop a matching framework that allows for demand rationing. Our findings indicate that the optimal response to a housing demand shock is to stabilize inflation in the non-housing sector while disregarding housing inflation. Our results hold exactly in a version of the model with costless search and quantitatively in a version with housing search costs calibrated to match US data on housing tenure, vacancy rates, and the size of the real estate sector.

We present a dynamic general equilibrium model of homelessness calibrated to the U.S. data and evaluate the effectiveness of several policies in the fight against homelessness. The model is designed to capture the most at-risk groups, producing a diverse homeless population that includes a significant portion experiencing short-term homelessness due to labor market shocks and a smaller portion facing chronic homelessness mostly due to health shocks. Our policy experiments reveal that the existing housing voucher program effectively reduces homelessness especially when the general equilibrium effects are accounted for. We show that increasing the reach of the program for eligible individuals can lead to further declines in the aggregate homeless rate relative to alternative forms of subsidies. However, policies targeted to help decrease homelessness are not as popular as general poverty reduction tools such as cash subsidies, which generate a larger welfare gain in our experiments.

We develop a time series of quits and layoffs using the Current Population Survey, and analyze their relationship with labor supply decisions over the business cycle. Our findings challenge the assumption that most labor force exits from employment (EN) are voluntary quits. Instead, we show that 40% of these exits are precipitated by layoffs. With this distinction, both quits to non-participation and the share of workers exiting after a layoff falls during recessions. A workhorse search model is used to frame how these facts add nuance to our understanding of business cycles. Additional results explore regularities of these patterns in the cross section of workers, in the COVID-19 recovery, and in comparison to the JOLTS series on quits and layoffs.

In an economy with incomplete markets and consumers who are sufficiently risk averse, we show that the government can uniquely implement a permanent primary deficit using nominal debt and continuous Markov strategies for primary deficits and payments to debtholders. But this result fails if there are also useless pieces of paper (bitcoin for short) that can be traded. If there is trade in bitcoin, then there is no continuous Markov strategy for the government that leads to unique implementation. Instead, there is a continuum of equilibria with distinct real allocations in which the price of bitcoin converges to zero. And there is a balanced budget trap: continuous government policies designed for a permanent primary deficit cannot eliminate an alternative steady state in which r - g = 0 and the government is forced to balance its budget. A legal prohibition against bitcoin can restore unique implementation of permanent primary deficits, and so can a tax on bitcoin at the rate -(r - g) > 0.

This online appendix accompanies Institute Working Paper 101: Dynamics of Deterrence: A Macroeconomic Perspective on Punitive Justice Policy.

We argue that transitional dynamics play a critical role in evaluating the effects of punitive incarceration reform on crime, inequality, and labor markets. Individuals’ past choices regarding crime and employment under previous policies have persistent consequences that limit their responsiveness to policy changes. We provide novel cohort evidence supporting this mechanism. A quantitative model of this theory, calibrated using restricted administrative data, predicts nuanced dynamics of crime and incarceration that are distinct across property and violent crime and similar to the U.S. experience after 1980. Increased inequality and declining employment accompany these changes, with unequal impacts across generations.

While rising house prices are known to benefit existing homeowners, we document a new channel through which house price shocks have intergenerational wealth effects. Using panel data from school zones within a large U.S. school district, we find that higher local house prices lead to improvements in local school quality, thereby increasing children's human capital and future incomes. We quantify this housing wealth channel using an overlapping generations model with neighborhood choice, spatial equilibrium, and endogenous school quality. We find that housing market shocks generate large intergenerational wealth effects that account for around one-third of total housing wealth effects.

Greece experienced a boom until 2007, followed by a collapse of unprecedented magnitude and persistence. We assess the sources of the boom and the bust, using a rich estimated dynamic general equilibrium model. External demand and government consumption fueled the boom in production, whereas transfers fueled the boom in consumption. Different from the standard narrative, wages and prices declined substantially during the bust. Tax policy accounts for the largest fraction of the bust in production, whereas uninsurable risk accounts for the bust in consumption and wages. We assess how the composition of fiscal adjustment and bailouts affected the crisis.

We measure health inequality during middle and old age by race, ethnicity, and gender and evaluate the extent to which it can explain inequalities in other key economic outcomes using the Health and Retirement Study data set. Our main measure of health is frailty, which is the fraction of one’s possible health deficits and is related to biological age. We find staggering health inequality: At age 55, Black men and women have the frailty, or biological age, of White men and women 13 and 20 years older, respectively, while Hispanic men and women exhibit frailty akin to White men and women 5 and 6 years older. The health deficits composing frailty reveal that most health deficits are more likely for Black and Hispanic people than for White people, with the notable exception of those requiring a diagnosis. Imputing medical diagnoses to Black and Hispanic people uncovers even larger health gaps, especially for Black men. Health inequality also emerges as a powerful determinant of economic inequality. If Black individuals at age 55 had the health of their White peers, the life expectancy gap between these two groups would halve, and the gap in disability duration would decrease by 40-70%. Other outcomes are similarly affected by health at age 55, indicating that targeted health interventions for minority groups before middle age could substantially reduce economic disparities in the quantity and quality of life.

We show that the first and only experiment of U.S. mass production of houses, in a factory-built home industry that became known as the Mobile Home industry (and today, as the Manufactured Home industry), was a tremendous success. Mobile Home prices-psf fell by two-thirds from 1955 to 1973, as productivity soared; home quality rose significantly, with Mobile Home building codes receiving ANSI certification in 1963 and National Fire Protection Association co-sponsorship in 1965; as production soared, Mobile Homes accounted for one-third of single-family homes produced in the early 1970s. These feats were achieved as industry leaders developed state-wide building codes for Mobile Homes. This dramatically increased the size of the market for them. Factories invested in specialized machinery to produce simple and standardized products, substituting machinery for labor. Given each factory produced under the same code, industry-induced productivity gains followed, including external effects and directed technical change. Lessons from this industry give insights into critical issues in today's residential construction industry. The poor productivity performance of today's residential construction industry is considered a puzzle. But this poor performance is not new. Our forebears before 1950 wrote extensively about the sector's poor performance, attributing it to the failure to adopt factory-built housing. Our analysis strongly supports this view - for their time and ours. It also supports their view, like that of Levitt & Sons, that factory production is the only way "to produce the homes and apartments needed to house our expanding population and our underprivileged citizens in a comfortable, dignified, decent way," (U.S. Senate 1969).

The empirical literature on the stability of the Phillips curve has largely ignored the bias that endogenous monetary policy imparts on estimated Phillips curve coefficients. We argue that this omission has important implications. When policy is endogenous, estimation based on aggregate data can be uninformative as to the existence of a stable relationship between unemployment and future inflation. But we also argue that regional data can be used to identify the structural relationship between unemployment and inflation. Using city-level and state-level data from 1977 to 2017, we show that both the reduced form and the structural parameters of the Phillips curve are, to a substantial degree, quite stable over time.

Differences in household saving rates are a key driver of wealth inequality. But what determines these differences in saving rates and wealth accumulation? We provide a new answer to this longstanding question based on new empirical evidence and a new modeling framework. In the data, we decompose U.S. household wealth into its main portfolio components to document two new empirical facts. First, the variation in wealth by income is mainly driven by differences in participation in asset markets rather than by the amounts invested. Wealth differences are a matter of to have or not to have. Second, the large heterogeneity in asset market participation closely follows observed differences in access to asset markets. Combining these two facts, we develop a new model of life-cycle wealth accumulation in which income-dependent market access is the key driver of differences in asset market participation and saving rates by income. The calibrated model accurately captures the joint distribution of income and wealth. Eliminating heterogeneity in access to asset markets increases wealth accumulation in the bottom half of the income distribution by 32%. Facilitating access to employer-sponsored retirement accounts improves broad-based wealth accumulation in the U.S. economy. Historical data support the model’s prediction.

Like most countries, the Chilean government closed schools as part of its pandemic public health mandates in order to restrict social-contact activities and reduce disease spread. We study the impact of central planner variation in school re-openings on parental labor supply, focusing on the initial three months after schools partially re-opened. We find that mothers’ labor force participation (LFP) decreased by 5.1 percentage points (ppts) one month after re-opening relative to mothers near closed schools. It decreased 9.5 ppts among householder mothers. These magnitudes weakened over time. Two or three months out, mothers who stayed in the labor force saw minimal increase in their ability to actively work and, more specifically, to work in informal jobs. In contrast, fathers’ LFP immediately increased anywhere from 2.0 to 2.9 ppts. Unplanned care disruptions during the re-opening of schools, an artifact of quarantine policies related to sickness and exposure, had differential effects on parental labor supply. Our findings support a theory that parental labor supply is uniquely sensitivity to the care transitions of children both in terms of gender and the householder status of the parent. Policies that encourage consistency in care transitions would largely benefit mothers’ ability to stay engaged in the labor force and advance in paid jobs and careers, especially when they are the householder.

Neighborhoods have a profound and lasting impact on children’s economic outcomes later in life, challenging the equality of opportunity promised by the American Dream. We develop a dynamic spatial equilibrium model in which children’s education choices are shaped by the costs and returns to education in their childhood location. Local returns depend on the moving-cost-adjusted education wage premia in all locations and local costs on the per-student school funding raised from local taxes. In the calibrated model, equalizing school funding across all students decreases differences in education outcomes across US counties and increases intergenerational mobility. However, the reform reduces the supply of educated workers in locations where the demand for them is highest, lowering aggregate output. Policies that instead broaden access to counties with good education outcomes increase intergenerational mobility without reducing output.

We use panel data from the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth from 1991 to 2016 to document empirically what components of the household budget constraint change in response to shocks to household labor income, both over shorter and over longer horizons. We show that shocks to labor income are associated with negligible changes in transfers and non-labor income components, modest changes in consumption expenditures, and large changes in wealth. We then split the sample in households which do not own business or real estate wealth, and households who do. For the first group, we find that consumption responses are more substantial (and increasing with the horizon of the income shock) and wealth responses are much smaller. We show that, for this group, a version of the standard PIH framework that allows for partial insurance against even permanent income shocks can explain well the consumption and wealth responses, both at short and long horizons. For the second group the standard framework cannot explain the large changes in wealth associated with income shocks. We conclude that models which include shocks to the value of household wealth are necessary to fully evaluate the sources and the consequences of household resource risk.

We present two valuation models which we use to account for the annual data on price per share and dividends per share for the CRSP Value-Weighted Index from 1929 to 2023. We show that it is a simple matter to account for these data based purely on a model of variation over time in the expected ratio of dividends per share to aggregate consumption under two conditions. First, investors must receive news shocks regarding the expected ratio of dividends per share to aggregate consumption in the long run. Second, the discount rate used to evaluate the impact of this news on the current price per share must be low. We use the approach of Campbell and Shiller (1987) and Campbell and Shiller (1988) to argue that the cash flow news in our model is not a stand-in for changes in expected returns: with our model parameters, returns are not predictable and price dividend spreads and ratios predict dividend growth at model-implied magnitudes. We illustrate which parameter choices account for differences between our results and prior findings in the literature. We conclude that the answer to Shiller’s (1981) question “Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent movements in dividends?” is “not necessarily.”

The interest rate on government debt is significantly lower than the rates of return on other assets. From the perspective of standard models of optimal taxation, this empirical fact is puzzling: typically, the government should finance expenditures either through contingent taxes, or by previously-issued state-contingent debt, or by labor taxes, with only minor effects arising from intertemporal distortions on interest rates. We study how this answer changes in an economy with financial frictions, where the government cannot directly redistribute towards the agents in need of liquidity, but has otherwise access to a complete set of linear tax instruments. We establish a stark result. Provided this is feasible, optimal policy calls for the government to increase its debt, up to the point at which it provides sufficient liquidity to avoid financial constraints. In this case, capital-income taxes are zero in the long run, and the returns on government debt and capital are equalized. However, if the fiscal space is insufficient, a wedge opens between the rate of return on government debt and capital. In this case, optimal long-run tax policy is driven by a trade-off between the desire to mitigate financial frictions by subsidizing capital and the incentive to exploit the quasi-rents accruing to producers of capital by taxing capital instead. This latter incentive magnifies the wedge between rates of return on publicly and privately-issued assets.

The return on government debt is lower than that of asset with similar payoffs. We study optimal debt management and taxation when the government cannot directly redistribute towards the agents in need of liquidity but otherwise has access to a complete set of linear tax instruments. Optimal government debt provision calls for gradually closing the wedge between the returns as much as possible, but tax policy may work as a countervailing force: as long as financial frictions bind, it can be optimal to tax capital even if this magnifies the discrepancy in returns.

While health affects many economic outcomes, its dynamics are still poorly understood. We use k-means clustering, a machine learning technique, and data from the Health and Retirement Study to identify health types during middle and old age. We identify five health types: the vigorous resilient, the fair-health resilient, the fair-health vulnerable, the frail resilient, and the frail vulnerable. They are characterized by different starting health and health and mortality trajectories. Our five health types account for 84% of the variation in health trajectories and are not explained by observable characteristics, such as age, marital status, education, gender, race, health-related behaviors, and health insurance status, but rather, by one’s past health dynamics. We also show that health types are important drivers of health and mortality heterogeneity and dynamics. Our results underscore the importance of better understanding health type formation and of modeling it appropriately to properly evaluate the effects of health on people’s decisions and the implications of policy reforms.

The Frisch labor supply elasticity plays a key role in many economic policy debates, but its magnitude remains controversial. Many studies estimate the Frisch elasticity using 2SLS regressions of hours changes on wage changes. But a little appreciated power asymmetry property of 2SLS causes estimates to appear spuriously imprecise when they are shifted away from the OLS bias. This makes it difficult for a 2SLS t-test to detect a true positive Frisch elasticity. We illustrate this problem in an application to NLSY97 data. We obtain an estimate of 0.60 for young men, but the t-test indicates it is insignificant. In contrast, the Anderson-Rubin (AR) test – which avoids the power asymmetry problem – implies the estimate is highly significant. The same power asymmetry issue that afflicts the t-test here will arise in many IV applications. Thus, we argue the AR test should be widely adopted in lieu of the t-test.

We study how negative sentiment around an industry impacts beliefs and behaviors, focusing on demands for racial justice after the murder of George Floyd and the salience of the “defund the police” movement. We assess stakeholder beliefs on the impact of protests on the stock prices of police-affiliated firms. In our survey experiment, laypeople and finance professionals predicted more negative stock price outcomes when they lacked details on the products supplied by such firms. Exposure to narratives about the context of the protests further reduced the prediction accuracy of these groups. In contrast, product information improved the prediction accuracy of respondents. Turning to real-life behavior, we find that mutual funds exposed to protests were 20% less likely to hold police stocks, after the protests, than funds in areas without protests. Political support for maintaining police funding, though in the majority, declined by 4.3 percentage points in protest areas. The salience of the “defund the police” narrative led to significant overreactions in both financial predictions and real-life behavior.

Using rural household survey data from West Bengal, we find that voters respond positively to excludable government welfare benefits but not to local public good programs, while reporting having benefited from both. Consistent with these voting patterns, shocks to electoral competition induced by exogenous redistricting of villages resulted in upper-tier governments manipulating allocations across local governments only for excludable benefit programs. Using a hierarchical budgeting model, we argue these results provide credible evidence of the presence of clientelism rather than programmatic politics.

After 1980, larger US cities experienced substantially faster wage growth than smaller ones. We show that this urban bias mainly reflected wage growth at large Business Services firms. These firms stand out through their high per-worker expenditure on information technology and disproportionate presence in big cities. We introduce a spatial model of investment-specific technical change that can rationalize these patterns. Using the model as an accounting framework, we find that the observed decline in the investment price of information technology capital explains most urban-biased growth by raising the profits of large Business Services firms in big cities.

We explore the evolution of income inequality and mobility in the U.S. for a large number of subnational groups defined by race and ethnicity, using granular statistics describing income distributions, income mobility, and conditional income growth derived from the universe of tax filers and W-2 recipients that we observe over a two-decade period (1998–2019). We find that income inequality and income growth patterns identified from administrative tax records differ in important ways from those that one might identify in public survey sources. The full set of statistics that we construct is available publicly alongside this paper as the Income Distributions and Dynamics in America, or IDDA, dataset. Using two applications, we illustrate IDDA’s relevance for understanding income inequality trends. First, we extend Bayer and Charles (2018) beyond earnings gaps between Black and White men and document that, unlike those for other groups, earnings for both Black men and Black women fell behind earnings for White men following the Great Recession. This trend lasted through 2019, the end of the data period. Second, we document a significant reversal in the convergence of earnings for Native earners in Native areas.

Property taxes impact the housing distribution across generations. Low property taxes lead to concentrated ownership among elderly empty-nesters, limiting housing for financially constrained young families. Conversely, high property taxes act as a “forced mortgage,” reducing upfront downpayments and enabling greater homeownership among younger households. We show in an overlapping generations model that raising property taxes in low-tax California to match those in higher-tax Texas increases homeownership in California by 4.6% and among younger households by 7.4% in steady state. Asset taxes can reallocate housing to higher-valuation households in the presence of financial constraints, providing an independent rationale for property taxes.

We build a scenario for inflation in the United States in the years to come. Following Gao, Kulish, and Nicolini (2021), we use the quantity theory of money as a conceptual framework and confront the theory with evidence from both the United States and other OECD countries. We argue that a) the quantity theory of money works very well in the medium term, which we define to be close to four years; b) deviations from the inflation rate predicted by the quantity theory tend to disappear in the medium term; c) the burst in inflation that started in 2012 in the United States is a deviation from the inflation rate predicted by the quantity theory; and d) if the policy framework does not change, we expect inflation to be back close to its 2% target no later than 2025.

We build a scenario for inflation in the United States in the years to come. Following Gao, Kulish, and Nicolini (2021), we use the quantity theory of money as a conceptual framework and confront the theory with evidence from both the United States and other OECD countries. We argue that a) the quantity theory of money works very well in the medium term, which we define to be close to four years; b) deviations from the inflation rate predicted by the quantity theory tend to disappear in the medium term; c) the burst in inflation that started in 2021 in the United States is a deviation from the inflation rate predicted by the quantity theory; and d) if the policy framework does not change, we expect inflation to be back close to its 2% target no later than 2025.

The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we wish to better explain the relationship between Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) unpleasant monetarist arithmetic, the closely connected fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL), and the monetarist view of inflation. Second, we discuss how the recent inflationary episode has contributed to redistributing real resources from holders of government debt to the public purse. In particular, financial prices before the onset of the COVID pandemic suggest that investors viewed an inflationary shock such as the one we experienced as extremely unlikely, so the magnitude of this redistribution caught them by surprise.

We develop a sovereign default model with debt renegotiation in which interest-rate shocks affect default incentives through two mechanisms. The first mechanism, the standard mechanism, depends on how a higher interest rate tightens the government’s budget constraint. The second mechanism, the renegotiation mechanism, depends on how a higher rate increases lenders’ opportunity cost of holding delinquent debt, which makes lenders accept larger haircuts and makes default more attractive for the government. We use the model to study the 1982 Mexican default, which followed a large increase in U.S. interest rates. We argue that our novel renegotiation mechanism is key for reconciling standard sovereign default models with the narrative that U.S. monetary tightening triggered the crisis.

We document how export quantities and prices evolve after entry to a market. Controlling for marginal cost, and taking account of selection on idiosyncratic demand, there are economically and statistically significant dynamics of quantities, but no dynamics of prices. To match these facts, we estimate a model where firms invest in customer base through non-price actions (e.g. marketing and advertising), and learn gradually about their idiosyncratic demand. The model matches quantity, price and exit moments. Parameter estimates imply costs of adjusting investment in customer base, and slow learning about demand, both of which generate sluggish responses of sales to shocks.

In the past three decades, governments in emerging markets have accumulated large amounts of international reserves, especially those with fixed exchange rates. We propose a theory of reserve accumulation that can account for these facts. Using a model of endogenous sovereign default with nominal rigidities, we show that the interaction between sovereign risk and aggregate demand amplification generates a macroeconomic-stabilization hedging role for international reserves. Reserves increase debt sustainability to such an extent that financing reserves with debt accumulation may not lead to increases in spreads. We also study simple and implementable rules for reserve accumulation. Our findings suggest that a simple linear rule linked to spreads can achieve significant welfare gains, while those rules currently used in policy studies of reserve adequacy can be counterproductive.

We present a tractable dynamic macroeconomic model of self-fulfilling bank runs. A bank is vulnerable to a run when a loss of investors’ confidence triggers deposit withdrawals and leads the bank to default on its obligations. We analytically characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on macroeconomic aggregates and how the number of banks facing a run affects macroeconomic aggregates in turn. In general equilibrium, runs can be partial or complete, depending on aggregate leverage and the dynamics of asset prices. Our normative analysis shows that the effectiveness of credit easing and its welfare implications depend on whether a financial crisis is driven by fundamentals or by self-fulfilling runs.

We explore quantitatively the possibility of multiple equilibria in a model of sovereign debt crises. The source of multiplicity is the one identified by Calvo (1988). This type of multiplicity has been at the heart of the policy debate through the recent European sovereign debt crisis. Key for multiplicity in the model is a stochastic process for output featuring long periods of either high or low growth. We calibrate the output process in the model using data for the southern European countries that were exposed to the debt crisis. We find that expectations-driven sovereign debt crises are empirically plausible, but only in periods of stagnation. Multiplicity is state dependent: in periods of stagnation and for intermediate levels of debt, interest rates may be high for reasons unrelated to fundamentals.

We assess the quantitative relevance of expectations-driven sovereign debt crises, focusing on the southern European crisis of the early 2010s and the Argentine default of 2001. The source of multiplicity is the one in Calvo (1988). Crucial for multiplicity is an output process characterized by long periods of either high growth or stagnation, which we estimate using data for these countries. We find that expectations-driven debt crises are quantitatively relevant but state dependent, as they occur only during periods of stagnation. Expectations, and how they respond to policy, are the major factors explaining default rates and credit spread differences between Spain and Argentina.

This note addresses the role of the Taylor principle to solve the indeterminacy of equilibria in economies in which the monetary authority follows an interest rate rule. We first study the role of imposing two additional ad-hoc restrictions on the definition of equilibrium. Imposing the equilibrium to be locally unique never delivers a unique outcome. Imposing the equilibrium to be bounded, renders the outcome unique only if the inflation target is the Friedman rule. Second, we show that the Taylor principle is strongly time inconsistent - in a sense we make very precise - and that policies that implement the Friedman rule are the only sustainable policies.

This paper discusses the extent to which the Taylor principle can solve the indeterminacy of equilibria in economies where the monetary authority follows an interest rate feedback rule. We first show that only the limiting behavior of the feedback rule matters, so identifying in the data if the Taylor principle holds cannot be achieved. Second, we show that the competitive equilibrium under interest rate feedback rules is nominally determined if the Taylor principle holds and, in addition, two ad-hoc restrictions on equilibrium are satisfied. These require equilibrium inflation to be bounded and equilibria to be locally unique. Finally, we show that the Taylor principle is strongly time inconsistent, in a sense we make very precise.

We formulate a framework showing that differences in capital returns and capital intensity between groups of firms can identify relative differences in consumer demand and credit constraints. Using micro-data on Black- and White-owned startups, we find robust evidence that Black-owned startups have lower capital returns, implying that Black-owned startups face lower consumer demand due to race. In contrast, we find mixed evidence of tighter credit constraints due to race. We further show that differences in capital returns are persistent over time, whereas capital intensity differences are transitory. This suggests that lower demand, rather than credit constraints, might be the main barrier to growth for Black-owned startups.

The racial wealth gap is the largest of the economic disparities between Black and white Americans, with a white-to-Black per capita wealth ratio of 6 to 1. It is also among the most persistent. In this paper, we construct the first continuous series on white-to-Black per capita wealth ratios from 1860 to 2020, drawing on historical census data, early state tax records, and historical waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances, among other sources. Incorporating these data into a parsimonious model of wealth accumulation for each racial group, we document the role played by initial conditions, income growth, savings behavior, and capital returns in the evolution of the gap. Given vastly different starting conditions under slavery, racial wealth convergence would remain a distant scenario, even if wealth-accumulating conditions had been equal across the two groups since Emancipation. Relative to this equal-conditions benchmark, we find that observed convergence has followed an even slower path over the last 150 years, with convergence stalling after 1950. Since the 1980s, the wealth gap has widened again as capital gains have predominantly benefited white households, and income convergence has stopped.

Non-Hispanic whites who do not have a college degree have experienced an increase in “deaths of despair” – deaths caused by suicide, drug use, and alcohol use. Yet, deaths of despair are proportionally largest among Native Americans and the rate of increase of these deaths matches that of non-Hispanic white Americans. Native American women and girls face the largest differentials: deaths of despair comprise over 10% of all deaths among Native American women and girls – almost four times as high as the proportion of deaths for non-Hispanic white women and girls. However, the factors related to these patterns are very different for Native Americans than they are for non-Hispanic white Americans. Improvements in economic conditions are associated with decreased deaths from drug use, alcohol use, and suicide for non-Hispanic white Americans. On the other hand, in counties with higher labor force participation rates, lower unemployment, and higher ratios of employees to residents, there are significantly higher Native American deaths attributed to suicide and drug use. These results suggest that general improvements in local labor market conditions may not be associated with a reduction in deaths of despair for all groups.

The #MeToo movement has demonstrated that assaults between colleagues are an internationally relevant phenomenon. In this paper, we link every police report in Finland to administrative data to identify assaults between colleagues, and the economic consequences for victims, perpetrators, and firms. This new approach to observe when one colleague attacks another overcomes previous data constraints limiting evidence on this phenomenon to self-reported surveys that do not identify perpetrators. We document large, persistent labor market impacts of between-colleague violence on victims and perpetrators. Male perpetrators experience substantially weaker consequences after attacking female colleagues. Perpetrators’ relative economic power in male-female violence partly explains this asymmetry. Turning to broader implications for firm recruitment and retention, we find that male-female violence causes a decline in women at the firm, both because fewer new women are hired and current female employees leave. There is no change in hiring from within existing employees’ networks, ruling out supply-side explanations for the reduction in new female hires via "whisper networks". Management practices play a key role in mediating the impacts on the wider workforce. Only male-managed firms lose women. Female managers do one important thing differently: fire perpetrators.

As of 2022, the share of U.S. income accruing to labor is at its lowest level since the Great Depression. Updating previous studies with more recent observations, I document the continuing decline of the labor share for the United States, other countries, and various industries. I discuss how changes in technology and product, labor, and capital markets affect the trend of the labor share. I also examine its relationship with other macroeconomic trends, such as rising markups, higher concentration of economic activity, and globalization. I conclude by offering some perspectives on the economic and policy implications of the labor share decline.

The extent to which households can self-insure and the government can help them to do so depends on the wage risk that they face and their family structure. We study wage risk in the UK and show that the persistence and riskiness of wages depends on one's age and position in the wage distribution. We also calibrate a model of couples and singles with two alternative processes for wages: a canonical one and a flexible one that allows for the much richer dynamics that we document in the data. We use our model to show that allowing for rich wage dynamics is important to properly evaluate the effects of benefit reform: relative to the richer process, the canonical process underestimates wage persistence for women and generates a more important role for in-work benefits relative to income support. The optimal benefit configuration under the richer wage process, instead, is similar to that in place in the benchmark UK economy before the Universal Credit reform. The Universal Credit reform generates additional welfare gains by introducing an income disregard for families with children. While families with children are better off, households without children, and particularly single women, are worse off.

Low-skilled immigrants indirectly affect public finances through their effect on native wages & labor supply. We operationalize this general-equilibrium effect in the workhorse labor market model with heterogeneous workers and intensive and extensive labor supply margins. We derive a closed-form expression for this effect in terms of estimable statistics. We extend the analysis to various alternative specifications of the labor market and production that have been emphasized in the immigration literature. Empirical quantifications for the U.S. reveal that the indirect fiscal benefit of one low-skilled immigrant lies between $770 and $2,100 annually. The indirect fiscal benefit may outweigh the negative direct fiscal effect that has previously been documented. This challenges the perception of low-skilled immigration as a fiscal burden.

Emerging markets have experienced large human and economic costs from COVID-19, and their tight fiscal space has limited the support extended to their citizens. We study the impact of an epidemic on economic and health outcomes by integrating epidemiological dynamics into a sovereign default model. The sovereign’s option to default tightens fiscal space and results in an epidemic with limited mitigation and depressed consumption. A quantitative analysis of our model accounts well for the dynamics of fatalities, social distancing, consumption, sovereign debt, and spreads in Latin America. We find that because of default risk, the welfare cost of the pandemic is about a third higher than it is in a version of the model with perfect financial markets. We study debt relief programs and find a compelling case for their implementation. These programs deliver large social gains, improving health and economic outcomes for the country at no cost to international lenders or financial institutions.

Houses are the most important asset on American households’ balance sheets, rendering the U.S. economy sensitive to house prices. There is a consensus that credit conditions affect house prices, but to what extent remains controversial, as an expansion in credit supply often coincides with changes in house price expectations. To address this longstanding question, we rely on novel microdata on the universe of mortgages guaranteed under the Veterans Administration (VA) loan program. We use the expansion of eligibility of veterans for the VA loan program following the Gulf War to estimate a long-lived effect of credit supply on house prices. We then exploit the segmentation of the conventional mortgage market from program eligibility to link this sustained house price growth to developments in the initially unaffected segment of the credit market. We uncover a net increase in credit for all other residential mortgage applicants that aligns closely with the evolution of house price growth, which supports the view that credit-induced house price shocks are amplified by beliefs.

Are labor markets in higher-income countries more meritocratic, in the sense that worker-job matching is based on skills rather than idiosyncratic attributes unrelated to productivity? If so, why? And what are the aggregate consequences? Using internationally comparable data on worker skills and job skill requirements of over 120,000 individuals across 28 countries, we document that workers’ skills better match their jobs’ skill requirements in higher-income countries. To quantify the role of worker-job matching in development accounting, we build an equilibrium matching model that allows for cross-country differences in three fundamentals: (i) the endowments of multidimensional worker skills and job skill requirements, which determine match feasibility; (ii) technology, which determines the returns to matching; and (iii) idiosyncratic matching frictions, which capture the role of nonproductive worker and job traits in the matching process. The estimated model delivers two key insights. First, improvements in worker-job matching due to reduced matching frictions account for only a small share of cross-country income differences. Second, however, improved worker-job matching is crucial for unlocking the gains from economic development generated by adopting frontier endowments and technology.

Labor protection policies in the 1950s and 1960s helped many low- and middle-wage white workers in the United States achieve the American Dream. This coincided with historically low levels of inequality across income deciles. After the Civil Rights Act of 1964, policies that had previously helped build the white middle class reversed, especially in states with a larger Black population. Calibrating a labor search model to match minimum wages, unemployment benefits, and bargaining power before and after the Civil Rights Act, I find declining labor protections explain half of the rise in 90/10 wage inequality since the 1960s.

A prominent explanation for why trade is not free is politicians’ desire to protect some of their constituents at the expense of others. In this paper we develop a methodology that can be used to reveal the welfare weights that a nation’s import tariffs implicitly place on different groups of society. Applied in the context of the United States in 2017, this method implies that redistributive trade protection accounts for a significant fraction of US tariff variation and causes large monetary transfers between US individuals, mostly driven by differences in welfare weights across sectors of employment. Perhaps surprisingly, differences in welfare weights across US states play a much smaller role.

We document that the protracted decline in the labor share has been accompanied by a decline in the tightness rate defined as the number of vacancies per job seekers. We argue that these two trends are related. When vacancies and job seekers are complements in the matching process, a decline in the tightness rate reduces workers’ fundamental bargaining power as defined by Hosios (1990), which in turn reduces the labor share of income. We calibrate a search and matching model extended to allow for an endogenous determination of bargaining power. The model can rationalize the common trends in the labor shares and tightness. According to the model, workers’ bargaining power declined by about 15 percent during the 1980–2007 period.

We introduce dynamic incentive contracts into a model of inflation and unemployment dynamics. Our main result is that wage cyclicality from incentives neither affects the slope of the Phillips curve for prices nor dampens unemployment dynamics. The impulse response of unemployment in economies with flexible, procyclical incentive pay is first-order equivalent to that of economies with rigid wages. Likewise, the slope of the Phillips curve is the same in both economies. This equivalence is due to effort fluctuations, which render effective marginal costs rigid even if wages are flexible. Our calibrated model suggests that 46% of the wage cyclicality in the data arises from incentives, with the remainder attributable to bargaining and outside options. A standard model without incentives calibrated to weakly procyclical wages matches the impulse response of unemployment in our incentive pay model calibrated to strongly procyclical wages.

Advanced economies borrowed substantially during the Covid recession to fund their fiscal policy. The Covid recession differed from the Great Recession in that sovereign debt markets remained calm and spreads barely responded. We study the experience of Greece, the most extreme manifestation of the puzzling behavior of spreads during Covid. We develop a small open economy model with long-term debt and default, which we augment with official lenders, heterogeneous households and sectors, and Covid constraints on labor supply and consumption demand. The model is quantitatively consistent with the observed boom-bust cycle of Greece before Covid and salient observations on macro aggregates, government debt, and the sovereign spread during Covid. The spread is stable despite a rise in external borrowing during Covid, because lockdowns were perceived as transitory and the bailouts of the 2010s had tilted the composition of debt at the beginning of Covid away from defaultable private debt. The ECB's policy of purchasing debt in secondary markets during Covid did not stabilize spreads so much, but allowed the government to provide transfers that reduced inequality.

Ways of leaving the labor force has been an understudied aspect of labor market outcomes. Labor market institutions such as occupational licensing may influence how individuals transition to retirement. When and how workers transition from career jobs to full retirement may contribute to pre- and post-retirement well-being. Previous investigations of retirement pathways focused on the patterns and outcomes of retirement transitions, yet the influence of occupational licensing on retirement transition has not been analyzed. In this study, we use the Current Population Survey and Survey of Income and Program Participation to investigate how occupational licensing influences American later-career workers’ choice of retirement pathways. Our results show that licensed workers are less likely to choose to change careers but more likely to reduce work hours in transitioning out of the workforce. These results are consistent with the findings that licensed workers receive more benefits in the form of preferable retirement options, suggesting that these workers tend to have higher wages, benefits, and flexibility even toward the end of their careers.

This paper investigates how a government should manage international reserves when it faces the risk of a rollover crisis. We ask, should the government accumulate reserves or reduce debt to make itself less vulnerable? We show that the optimal policy entails initially reducing debt, followed by a subsequent increase in both debt and reserves as the government approaches a safe zone. Furthermore, we uncover that issuing additional debt to accumulate reserves can lead to a reduction in sovereign spreads.

We examine banking regulation in a macroeconomic model of bank runs. We construct a general equilibrium model where banks may default because of fundamental or self-fulfilling runs. With only fundamental defaults, we show that the competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient. However, when banks are vulnerable to runs, banks’ leverage decisions are not ex-ante optimal: individual banks do not internalize that higher leverage makes other banks more vulnerable. The theory calls for introducing minimum capital requirements, even in the absence of bailouts.

The appendix accompanies Staff Report 605: How Do Voters Respond to Welfare vis-à-vis Public Good Programs? An Empirical Test for Clientelism.

By preemptive austerity, we mean a policy that increases taxes to deter potential rollover crises. The policy is so successful that the usual danger signal of a rollover crisis, a high yield on new bonds sold, does not show up because the policy eliminates the danger. Mechanically, high taxes make the safe zone in the model - the set of sovereign debt levels for which the government prefers to repay its debt rather than default - larger. By announcing a high tax rate at the beginning of the period, the government ensures that tax revenue will be high enough to service sovereign debt becoming due, which deters panics by international lenders but is ex-post suboptimal. That is why, as it engages in preemptive austerity, the government continues to reduce the level of debt to a point where, asymptotically, high taxes are no longer necessary.

We examine how the distribution of employment tenure has changed in aggregate and for various demographic groups, drawing links to trends in job stability and satisfaction. The fraction of workers with short tenure (less than a year) has been falling since at least the mid-1990s, consistent with the decline in job changing documented over this period. The decline in short-tenure was widespread across demographic groups, industry, and occupation. It appears to be associated with fewer workers cycling among briefly-held jobs and coincides with an increase in perceived job security among short tenure workers. Meanwhile, the fraction of workers with long tenure (20 years or more) has been rising modestly since the early 1980s owing to an increase in long tenure for women and the ageing of the population. The rise in long tenure for women was broad-based across industries and occupations but limited to married women. By contrast, long tenure has declined markedly among older men. This is only partly explained by changing demographics and employment patterns such as the decline in manufacturing and unionization. In addition, an increase in mid-career separations during the 1970s and 1980s appears to have reduced the likelihood of reaching long-tenure for men. Survey evidence indicates that – despite these substantive changes over time – longer-tenure workers report no greater concern about job insecurity or decreases in job satisfaction than four decades ago.

Black Americans face higher cyclical unemployment risk than white Americans: job-finding rates during recessions are lower and the risk of becoming long-term unemployed is higher. Differences in unemployment risk across Black and white Americans imply that Black Americans optimally invest less in risky assets. We show that differences in unemployment risk can explain up to 90% of the gap in the stock market shares of Black and white portfolios, resulting in lower returns on wealth for Black Americans. Through this portfolio channel, adverse labor market conditions for Black Americans translate into lower wealth returns and exacerbate racial wealth inequality.

Spatial differences in labor market performance are large and highly persistent. Using data from the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, we document striking similarities across these countries in the spatial differences in unemployment, vacancies, and job filling, finding, and separation rates. The novel facts on the geography of vacancies and job filling are instrumental in guiding and disciplining the development of a theory of local labor market performance. We find that a spatial version of a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model with endogenous separations and on-the-job search quantitatively accounts for all the documented empirical regularities. The model also quantitatively rationalizes why differences in job-separation rates have primary importance in inducing differences in unemployment across space while changes in the job-finding rate are the main driver in unemployment fluctuations over the business cycle.

We measure college graduate quality — the average human capital of a college’s graduates—using the average earnings of the college’s graduates adjusted to a common labor market. Our implementation uses the database of the website Glassdoor, which has the necessary information on earnings and education for non-migrants and migrants who graduate from roughly 3,300 colleges in 66 countries. Graduates of colleges in the richest countries have 50 percent more human capital than graduates of colleges in the poorest countries. Migration reinforces these differences. Poorer countries do not just lose a higher share of their skilled workers; their emigrants are highly positively selected on human capital. Finally, we show that these stocks and flows matter for growth and development by showing that college graduate quality predicts the share of a college’s students who become inventors, engage in entrepreneurship, and become top executives, both within and across countries.

We document four facts about the COVID-19 pandemic worldwide relevant for those studying the impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) on COVID-19 transmission. First: across all countries and U.S. states that we study, the growth rates of daily deaths from COVID-19 fell from a wide range of initially high levels to levels close to zero within 20-30 days after each region experienced 25 cumulative deaths. Second: after this initial period, growth rates of daily deaths have hovered around zero or below everywhere in the world. Third: the cross section standard deviation of growth rates of daily deaths across locations fell very rapidly in the first 10 days of the epidemic and has remained at a relatively low level since then. Fourth: when interpreted through a range of epidemiological models, these first three facts about the growth rate of COVID deaths imply that both the effective reproduction numbers and transmission rates of COVID-19 fell from widely dispersed initial levels and the effective reproduction number has hovered around one after the first 30 days of the epidemic virtually everywhere in the world. We argue that failing to account for these four stylized facts may result in overstating the importance of policy mandated NPIs for shaping the progression of this deadly pandemic.

Using linked employer-employee data from Brazil, we document a large gender pay gap due to women working at lower-paying employers with better amenities. To interpret these facts, we develop an equilibrium search model with endogenous firm pay, amenities, and employment. We provide a constructive proof of identification of all model parameters. The estimated model suggests that amenities are important for men and women, that compensating differentials explain half of the gender pay gap, and that there are significant output and welfare gains from eliminating gender differences. However, equal-treatment policies fail to achieve those gains.

In this appendix, we describe the numerical methods used to compute an equilibrium in the economy with an inelastic labor supply and in the economy with an elastic labor supply (i.e., our benchmark economy). Although the economy with inelastically supplied labor is a special case of the benchmark economy, the equilibrium in the inelastic labor supply case is much easier to compute and is therefore treated separately. In each case, we start with the consumer's problem, assuming the consumer takes prices as given. We then show how the equilibrium prices are determined. To verify that the methods work well with our problem, we apply them to some related test problems that have known solutions.

This paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a Ramsey tax model. More generally, it develops a dynamic programming method for a class of policy games between the government and a continuum of consumers. By selectively incorporating Euler conditions into a strategic dynamic programming framework, we wed two technologies that are usually considered competing alternatives, resulting in a dramatic simplification of the problem.

This paper measures the output costs of sovereign risk by combining a sovereign debt model with firm- and bank-level data. An increase in sovereign risk lowers the price of government debt and has an adverse impact on banks’ balance sheets, disrupting their ability to finance firms. The resulting fall in credit supply impacts firms directly, as they need to borrow at higher interest rates, and indirectly through general equilibrium effects on the price of inputs and other goods. Importantly, firms are not equally affected by these developments: those that have greater financing needs and that borrow from banks that hold more government debt are mostly affected by the change in borrowing rates, while firms that do not borrow are only impacted indirectly. We show that these direct and indirect effects can be recovered using a firm-level regression, which we estimate using Italian data. We calibrate our model to match the measured firm-level elasticities and find that heightened sovereign risk was responsible for one-third of the observed output decline during the Italian debt crisis.

This paper characterizes the allocations that emerge in general equilibrium economies populated by households with preferences of the additive random utility type that make discrete consumption, employment or spatial decisions. We start with a complete markets economy where households can trade claims contingent upon the realizations of their preference shocks. We (i) establish a first and second welfare theorem, (ii) illustrate that in the absence of ex-ante trade, discrete choice economies are generically inefficient, (iii) show that complete markets are not necessary and a much smaller set of securities decentralizes the efficient allocation. We illustrate the relevance of these results in several canonical settings and for measuring how welfare changes in response to changes in prices.

In the U.S, after age 65, households face income and health risks and a large fraction of these risks are transitory. While consumption significantly responds to transitory income shocks, out-of-pocket medical expenses do not. In contrast, both consumption and out-of-pocket medical expenses respond to transitory health shocks. Thus, most U.S. elderly keep their out-of-pocket medical expenses close to a satiation point that varies with health. Consumption responds to health shocks mostly because adverse health shocks reduce the marginal utility of consumption. The effect of health on marginal utility changes the optimal transfers due to health shocks.

A weakening of labor protection policies is often invoked as one cause of observed monopsony power and the decline in labor’s share of income, but little evidence exists on the causal impact of labor policies on wage markdowns. Using confidential Mexican economic census data from 1994 to 2019, we document a rising trend over this period in on-site outsourcing. Then, leveraging data from a manufacturing panel survey from 2013 to 2023 and a natural experiment featuring a ban on domestic outsourcing in 2021, we show that the ban drastically reduced outsourcing, increased wages, and reduced measured markdowns without lowering output or employment. Consistent with the presence of monopsony power, we observe large markdowns for the largest firms, with the decline in markdowns in response to the ban concentrated among high-markdown firms. However, we also find that the reform reduced capital investment and increased the probability of market exit.

Financial integration generates macroeconomic spillovers that may require international monetary policy coordination. We show that individual central banks may set nominal interest rates too low or too high relative to the cooperative outcome. We identify three sufficient statistics that determine whether the Nash equilibrium exhibits under-tightening or over-tightening: the output gap, sectoral differences in labor intensity, and the trade balance response to changes in nominal rates. Independently of the shocks hitting the economy, we find that under-tightening is possible during economic expansions or contractions. For large shocks, the gains from coordination can be substantial.

This paper explores the role of restrictions on the use of international reserves as economic sanctions. We develop a simple model of the strategic game between a sanctioning (creditor) country and a sanctioned (debtor) country. We show how the sanctioning country should impose restrictions optimally, internalizing the geopolitical benefits and the financial costs of a potential default from the sanctioned country.

We characterize the little wage information contained in online job posts. Wage information is rare: only 14% of posts contain any information. Of these, wage ranges are more common than point wages, and are wide on average, spanning 28% of the midpoint (e.g. $32,000-$42,000/yr). Posted wages are highly selected in low income occupations: 40% higher than wages of employed workers. High wage firms are more opaque, with more and wider ranges. We find zero correlation between wage information and local labor market tightness. We provide an example of bias in econometric inference that worsens as wage information falls.

In the 1960 cohort, American men and women graduated from college at the same rate, and this was true for Whites, Blacks and Hispanics. But in more recent cohorts, women graduate at much higher rates than men. To understand the emerging gender education gap, we formulate and estimate a model of individual and family decision-making where education, labor supply, marriage and fertility are all endogenous. Assuming preferences that are common across ethnic groups and fixed over cohorts, our model explains differences in all endogenous variables by gender/ethnicity for the ‘60-‘80 cohorts based on three exogenous factors: family background, labor market and marriage market constraints. Changes in parental background are a key factor driving the growing gender education gap: Women with college educated mothers get greater utility from college, and are much more likely to graduate themselves. The marriage market also contributes: Women’s chance of getting marriage offers at older ages has increased, enabling them to defer marriage. The labor market is the largest factor: Improvement in women’s labor market return to college in recent cohorts accounts for 50% of the increase in their graduation rate. But the labor market returns to college are still greater for men. Women go to college more because their overall return is greater, after factoring in marriage market returns and their greater utility from college attendance. We predict the recent large increases in women’s graduation rates will cause their children’s graduation rates to increase further. But growth in the aggregate graduation rate will slow substantially, due to significant increases in the share of Hispanics – a group with a low graduation rate – in recent birth cohorts.

We analytically characterize the aggregate productivity loss from allocative distortions in a setting that accounts for the sectoral linkages of production. We show that the effects of distortions and the role of sectoral linkages depend crucially on how substitutable inputs are. We find that the productivity loss is smaller if input substitutability is low. Moreover, with low input substitutability, sectoral linkages do not systematically amplify the effects of distortions. In addition, the impact of the sectors that supply intermediate inputs becomes smaller. We quantify these effects in the context of the distortions caused by market power, using industry-level data for 35 countries. With our benchmark calibration, which accounts for low input substitutability, the median aggregate productivity loss from industry-level markups is 1.3%. To assume instead unit elasticities of substitution (i.e., to use a Cobb-Douglas production function) would lead to overestimating the productivity loss by a factor of 1.8. Sectoral linkages do amplify the cost of markups, but the amplification factor is considerably weaker than with unit elasticities.

We derive an optimal labor income tax rate formula for urban models in which tax rates are determined by traditional forces plus a new term arising from urban forces: house price, migration and agglomeration effects. Based on the earnings distributions and housing costs in large and small US cities, we find that in a benchmark model (i) optimal income tax rates are U-shaped, (ii) urban forces serve to raise optimal tax rates at all income levels and (iii) adopting an optimal tax system induces agents with low skills to leave large, productive cities. While agglomeration effects enter the optimal tax formula, they play almost no quantitative role in shaping optimal labor income tax rates.

We benchmark six global optimization algorithms by comparing their performance on challenging multidimensional test functions as well as on a method of simulated moments estimation of a panel data model of earnings dynamics. Five of the algorithms are from the popular NLopt open-source library: (i) Controlled Random Search with local mutation (CRS), (ii) Improved Stochastic Ranking Evolution Strategy (ISRES), (iii) Multi-Level Single-Linkage (MLSL), (iv) Stochastic Global Optimization (StoGo), and (v) Evolutionary Strategy with Cauchy distribution (ESCH). The sixth algorithm is TikTak, which is a multistart global optimization algorithm used in some recent economic applications. For completeness, we add three popular local algorithms to the comparison—the Nelder-Mead downhill simplex algorithm, the Derivative-Free Nonlinear Least Squares (DFNLS) algorithm, and a popular variant of the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell (DFPMIN) algorithm. To give a detailed comparison of algorithms, we use benchmarking tools recently developed in the optimization literature. We find that the success rate of many optimizers varies dramatically with the characteristics of each problem and the computational budget that is available. Overall, TikTak is the strongest performer both on the test functions and the economic application. The next-best performing optimizers are StoGo for the test functions and MLSL and ISRES for the economic application.

To to get the COVID-19 virus under control, many countries have shut down parts of the economy. Older individuals have the most to gain from slowing virus diffusion. Younger workers in sectors that are shuttered have most to lose. We build a model in which economic activity and disease progression are jointly determined. Individuals differ by age (young, retired), by sector (basic, luxury), and by health status. Disease transmission occurs in the workplace, through consumption, at home, and in hospitals. We study the optimal economic mitigation policy for a government that can redistribute through taxes and transfers, but where taxation distorts labor supply and output. Optimal redistribution and mitigation policies interact, and more modest shutdowns are optimal when redistribution creates tax distortions. A harder but shorter shutdown is preferred as vaccines become available in the first half of 2021.

We specify and calibrate a life-cycle model of labor supply and savings incorporating health shocks and medical treatment decisions. Our model features endogenous wage formation via human capital accumulation, employer-sponsored health insurance, and means-tested social insurance. We use the model to study the effects of health shocks on health, labor supply and earnings, and to assess how health shocks contribute to earnings inequality. We also simulate provision of public insurance to agents who lack employer-sponsored insurance. The public insurance program substantially increases medical usage by the uninsured, leading to improved health and life expectancy, which generates higher Social Security costs. But the program also creates positive labor supply incentives, and substantially reduces costs of social insurance, Medicaid and free care. On balance the net program cost is modest, and all agents in the model are ex ante better off in a balanced budget simulation. In contrast, improving access to Medicaid has perverse labor supply effects, does little to improve health, and makes almost all agents worse off in a balanced budget scenario.

This paper reports the results of a large, school-level randomized controlled trial evaluating a set of three informational interventions for young people choosing high schools in 473 middle schools, serving over 115,000 8th graders. The interventions differed in their level of customization to the student and their mode of delivery (paper or online); all treated schools received identical materials to scaffold the decision-making process. Every intervention reduced likelihood of application to and enrollment in schools with graduation rates below the city median (75 percent). An important channel is their effect on reducing nonoptimal first choice application strategies. Providing a simplified, middle-school specific list of relatively high graduation rate schools had the largest impacts, causing students to enroll in high schools with 1.5-percentage point higher graduation rates. Providing the same information online, however, did not alter students’ choices or enrollment. This appears to be due to low utilization. Online interventions with individual customization, including a recommendation tool and search engine, induced students to enroll in high schools with 1-percentage point higher graduation rates, but with more variance in impact. Together, these results show that successful informational interventions must generate engagement with the material, and this is possible through multiple channels.

This paper studies the implications of household heterogeneity for trade. I develop a model where household heterogeneity is induced via incomplete markets and results in heterogeneous price elasticities. Conditional on exposure to trade, heterogeneous price elasticities imply that different households value price changes differently, and thus rich and poor households experience different gains from trade. I calibrate the model to match bilateral trade flows and micro-facts about household-level expenditure patterns and elasticities. I find gains from trade that are pro-poor and that the average gains from trade are substantially larger than representative agent benchmarks.

This paper develops a New Keynesian model with sovereign default risk. Inflation is set by forward-looking firms, monetary policy is an interest rate rule, and the fiscal government borrows externally, long-term, with an option to default. In this framework, default risk creates inflation pressures through an expectations channel, and tight monetary policy disincentivizes fiscal overborrowing. The model sheds light on temporary inflation events in emerging market data, short-lived spikes in inflation, spreads, and domestic policy rates. As spreads rise, firms increase their prices in expectation of higher future inflation during defaults. Monetary policy tightens, which reduces inflation and helps bring spreads down by disciplining government borrowing. These monetary-fiscal interactions imply that delivering the flexible price allocation may not be optimal for monetary policy.

How generous should social insurance be when quits account for a large share of transitions into non-employment? We address this question using a multi-sector directed search model extended to incorporate endogenous quits both to other jobs and to non-employment. Workers quit too often in the competitive equilibrium, and private markets co-ordinate on excessively high “efficiency” wages. Quantitatively, we find that unemployment insurance is optimally much less generous in an economy with quits than in one without. An extended Baily-Chetty formula is derived to illustrate the source of this difference.

Multinational affiliates are more productive than domestic firms, so how do they affect a host country through the labor market? We use data for Norway to show that the labor market is characterized by a job ladder, with multinationals on the upper rungs. We calibrate a general equilibrium job ladder model with endogenous multinational entry to the Norwegian data. In a counterfactual where multinationals face an infinite entry cost, payments to labor fall and profits of domestic firms rise, but the impact is heterogeneous. Competition for workers increases low down on the job ladder, while it decreases high up.

We develop a two-country macroeconomic model that we fit to a set of aggregate prices and quantities for the U.S. and the rest of the world. In addition to a standard array of shocks, the model includes time variation in agents’ preference for safe bonds. We allow for a component of this time variation to be common across countries and biased toward dollar-denominated safe assets, and refer to this component as global flight to safety (GFS). We find that GFS shocks are the most important shocks driving world business cycles, and are also important drivers of activity in the U.S. and especially abroad. An adverse GFS shock lowers global GDP and inflation, widens global corporate credit spreads, and appreciates the dollar. These effects are very close to those obtained from a structural VAR which uses the excess bond premium (Gilchrist and Zakraj¡sek, 2012) as proxy for global flight to safety.

Heathcote et al. (2010) conducted an empirical analysis of several dimensions of inequality in the United States over the years 1967-2006, using publicly-available survey data. This paper expands the analysis, and extends it to 2021. We find that since the early 2000s, the college wage premium has stopped growing, and the race wage gap has stalled. However, the gender wage gap has kept shrinking. Both individual- and household-level income inequality have continued to rise at the top, while the cyclical component of inequality dominates dynamics below the median. Inequality in consumption expenditures has remained remarkably stable over time. Income pooling within the family and redistribution by the government have enormous impacts on the dynamics of household-level inequality, with the role of the family diminishing and that of the government growing over time. In particular, largely due to generous government transfers, the COVID recession has been the first downturn in fifty years in which inequality in disposable income and consumption actually declined.

This paper reassesses the conclusions of McGrattan and Prescott (2005), which derived the quantitative implications of growth theory for U.S. corporate valuations. In addition to having two more decades of data, the analysis incorporates recent changes in policies that affect corporate investments, taxes, and legal-form choice. Secular trends identified in the earlier period remain, with little change in the tangible capital-output ratio or profit share of output. Corporate valuations remain high relative to the postwar average, in line with the theoretical prediction. Critical to this prediction is the decline in effective tax rate on distributions and the rise of foreign direct investment abroad. With the recent enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, corporate valuations are predicted to rise even further relative to GDP.

We build a dataset of harmonized rotating panel labor force surveys covering 42 countries across a wide range of development and document three new empirical findings on labor market dynamics. First, labor market flows (job-finding rates, employment-exit rates, and job-to-job transition rates) are two to three times higher in the poorest as compared with the richest countries. Second, employment hazards in poorer countries decline more sharply with tenure; much of their high turnover can be attributed to high separation rates among workers with low tenure. Third, wage-tenure profiles are much steeper in poorer countries, despite the fact that wage-experience profiles are flatter. We show that these facts are consistent with theories with endogenous separation, particularly job ladder and learning models. We disaggregate our results and investigate possible driving forces that may explain why separation operates differently in rich and poor countries.