Creator: Townsend, Robert M., 1948- and Wallace, Neil Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 209 Abstract:
We use a model of pure, intertemporal exchange with spatially and information-ally separated markets to explain the existence of private securities which circulate and, hence, play a prominent role in exchange. The model, which utilizes a perfect foresight equilibrium concept, implies that a Schelling-type coordination problem can arise. It can happen that the amounts of circulating securities that are required to support an equilibrium and that are issued at the same time in informationally separated markets must satisfy restrictions not implied by individual maximization and market clearing in each market separately.
Keyword: Debts, Schelling pure coordination game, and Trade Subject (JEL): G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Creator: Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 260 Keyword: Nominal wages, Monetary payments, Contract, and Trade Subject (JEL): L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks and J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Creator: Marimon, Ramon, 1953- and Wallace, Neil Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 288 Abstract:
The consequences of costly divisibility of assets are studied using a model with the following features. The demand for assets is generated from an overlapping generations model with a continuum of agents in each generation and with intra-generation trade (intermediation) ruled out. There is a once-for-all supply of a stock of nonnegative-dividend assets in a large size, and there is a costly technology for dividing them into smaller sizes. Stationary equilibria are shown to exist. In contrast with similar models with costless divisibility of assets, competitive equilibria are not necessarily desirable; there can be Pareto-ordered equilibria.
Keyword: Asset, Depreciation, and Trade Subject (JEL): D50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
Creator: Levine, David K. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 388 Abstract:
Previous authors have argued that the optimal monetary policy is contractionary. If buyers value consumption substantially more than sellers, there is some randomness and informational constraints make asset trading useful, we show that there is an incentive compatible expansionary policy that dominates all incentive compatible contractionary policies.
Keyword: Expansion, Optimal monetary policy, Trade, Private information, Asset trading, and Contraction Subject (JEL): D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design and E52 - Monetary Policy